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Abstract: Community members and advocates have expressed concern that Austin 
Code enforcement activity in the city’s gentrifying neighborhoods contributes to 
residential displacement pressure. However, there is lack of clarity as to whether code is 
over-enforcing, causing financial pressure on low-income homeowners and property 
owners, or under-enforcing, exacerbating health, safety, and displacement risks for low-
income tenants. In this report, I compare the frequency of residential code complaints for 
2018 and stage of gentrification for Austin census tracts. I find that neighborhoods in 
Austin that are vulnerable to gentrification or in a stage of gentrification experience 
considerably higher rates of code complaints than neighborhoods that are not gentrifying 
and not vulnerable. This finding holds true for all major code complaint categories. 
Furthermore, this heightened complaint frequency cannot be accounted for by age and 
quality of housing stock alone, as complaint categories that are not related to structural 
conditions follow similar patterns. Several code complaint types increase in frequency 
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between gentrification stages. Code complaints for multi-family properties are highest in 
neighborhoods that are susceptible to gentrification and adjacent to a gentrifying tract, or 
“next in line” to gentrify.  
Interviews with supervisors from the Austin Code department and expert-
advocates from the Austin tenant advocacy community help clarify and interpret the 
results of these tests, and provide additional insight on the impact of code enforcement on 
residential vulnerability and neighborhood change. Topics that are discussed and debated 
include: potential developer abuse of the anonymous code complaint system, Austin 
Code’s mission and strategies, rental registration and proactive enforcement tradeoffs, 
and Austin Code data management and public data sharing processes. Recommendations 
suggest both administrative and legislative considerations that could help Austin Code 
better understand and serve the needs of the city’s vulnerable renters and homeowners. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
At an East Austin community meeting hosted by the City’s Anti-Displacement 
Task Force in early 2018, a local resident stood up in the audience to speak to the task 
force members and city officials that were present. He claimed that as the land market in 
his neighborhood had heated up in recent years, he and his neighbors had experienced a 
suspicious ramp up in code enforcement activities. He did not clarify whether he believed 
this was attributable to strategic action by Austin Code (Austin’s agency in charge of 
code enforcement) itself, or whether he believe that bad actors were using code 
complaints as a tactic to put extra pressure on low-income homeowners. But he was clear 
about this: Code personnel were not present in his neighborhood before, and now they 
were. He said that the money, time, and process navigation that it took to manage a code 
violation were putting additional pressures on East Austin residents who were vulnerable 
to displacement. Cheers, acknowledgements, and confirmations arose from other 
neighborhood residents in attendance as he spoke.  
 Claims that Austin Code willingly or unwittingly contributes to displacement 
pressure for vulnerable residents in neighborhoods experiencing gentrification by placing 
additional financial and bureaucratic burdens on homeowners and property owners that 
pressures them to sell to developers and flippers have been echoed by community 
advocates and even an East Austin city councilmember (Hernandez, 2018; McGhee, 
2017). However, tenants-rights groups and advocates have regularly criticized Code for 
the opposite: not adequately protecting the health and safety of vulnerable renters, 
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through under-enforcement or ineffective enforcement of building code at low-income, 
multi-family properties (Austin Code Department, 2017; McGlinchy, 2016; Way, Trinh, 
& Wyatt, 2013; Ullosa, 2012). Vulnerable Austin residents and groups that represent 
them would seem to be suspicious of Code both over-enforcing, contributing to 
displacement pressure for vulnerable residents, and under-enforcing, contributing to 
negative health and safety outcomes for vulnerable residents and also possibly leading to 
eventual displacement. 
 This report attempts to contribute analysis and perspective to the conversation 
about Austin Code’s activities in neighborhoods experiencing demographic change, 
gentrification, and displacement. This study compares 3-1-1 code complaint data from 
the City of Austin Open Data Portal with gentrification-stage measurements for all census 
tracts in the City of Austin from the 2018 University of Texas “Uprooted” report on 
gentrification and displacement for Austin City Council.1 This comparison answers a 
basic question: Are there more code complaints per occupied household in tracts that are 
experiencing gentrification, displacement, and neighborhood change than in other tracts 
in Austin? I conduct additional tests to assess the frequency of specific complaint types, 
and frequency of complaints on specific types of units. These test results are then 
supplemented with interviews with local expert-advocates and Austin Code supervisors, 
who help interpret the results of the analysis and also contextualize the conversation with 
what they see in the department and in the community.  
                                                
1 I was a contributing researcher on the “Uprooted” report. 
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This report draws inspiration from a series of recent studies that compare 3-1-1 
nuisance complaints (e.g. loud music) to tract or neighborhood level gentrification. These 
studies – all of which look at New York City neighborhoods – identify correlations 
between neighborhood change and increased nuisance complaints. They suggest that 
increased complaints, beyond their potential contribution to displacement of vulnerable 
residents, may also indicate social disorder between new and old residents, who may 
navigate social conflict in different ways and/or have different quality of life expectations 
for themselves and neighbors. 
The findings in this report show that code enforcement in Austin occurs at 
significantly higher frequencies in neighborhoods that are vulnerable to displacement or 
are experiencing gentrification than in neighborhoods that are not vulnerable and not 
gentrifying. This is true even for complaint types that are not health and safety related, 
and are not directly related to age and quality of building stock. This analysis finds that 
the frequency of code complaints in Austin in 2018 per occupied household in each 
census tract is highly correlated with whether the area is in a stage of gentrification. 
Tracts that are not gentrifying and not vulnerable to gentrification experienced code 
complaints at a rate of 3.9% per occupied household in 2018. Tracts that are vulnerable to 
gentrification, currently gentrifying, or already gentrified see code complaint rates 





Tracts that do not have the demographic mix that 
would make them vulnerable to gentrification 
Vulnerable Demographically vulnerable to displacement, but not currently gentrifying 
Susceptible Vulnerable and also adjacent to a gentrifying tract, likely to gentrify soon 
Gentrifying Currently experiencing displacement and neighborhood change 
Gentrified Has already experienced significant displacement and neighborhood change 
Table 1: Tract type descriptions 
 
I also tested whether the frequency of major complaint type categories correlated 
to gentrification stage. I found that each of the four major complaint type categories2 
correlates to demographic vulnerability and gentrification, and each is higher in tracts 
that are in stages of gentrification than in not gentrifying tracts. Land Use Violations are 
significantly higher in actively gentrifying (2.5% per occupied household) or gentrified 
(3.4%) tracts than elsewhere in the city (1.1% to 1.3%). Property abatement complaints 
are much higher in all stages of gentrification (3.4-4.3%) than they are in non-gentrifying, 
not vulnerable tracts (1.8%). Structural code complaints are low in not gentrifying 
                                                
2 The major categories used in Austin Code’s complaint database tested here are defined as follows:  
Land use violations: violations of Austin’s land development (i.e. zoning) code.  
Property abatement: a variety of violations having to do with the upkeep of properties, such as pulling in 
trash cans in a reasonable amount of time (“carts at curb”) and “tall grass and weeds.”  
Structural violations: violations involving the quality of structures themselves, ranging from cracks or 
holes in roofs to broken windows to water leaks that cause mold.  
Work without permit: improvements made to a property that are have not been property permitted with 
the City’s Development Services department. 
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neighborhoods (0.6%), rise in vulnerable tracts (2.4%), peak in susceptible tracts (2.8%), 
start to fall in gentrifying tracts (2.2%), neighborhoods, before settling again at a lower 
level in neighborhoods that are already gentrified (1.1%). Work without permit 
complaints, which make up a smaller overall percentage of total code complaints, are low 
in not gentrifying and vulnerable neighborhoods (~0.1%), rise in gentrifying 
neighborhoods (0.3%) and again in gentrified neighborhoods (0.5%). Chapter 3 lays out 
the methodology used to generate these results, and Chapter 4 describes these findings in 
greater detail. 
I supplemented these quantitative findings with interviews with both Austin Code 
supervisors and Austin-based experts and advocates who have experience with code 
enforcement and housing displacement issues. These interviews are presented in Chapter 
5. Interviewees helped clarify and interpret the results of the quantitative tests, and
suggested additional tests, such as individually testing different complaint types, which I 
then conducted. Interviewees provided critical context and nuance to the issues facing 
Austin Code and its potential relationship to residential gentrification and displacement. 
The topics of the interviews were wide ranging on this topic, and stretch beyond analysis 
of the primary tests in this report. However, the interviews provide valuable information 
sharing and problem identification that should be useful for stakeholders, and are 
presented in detail. 
Beyond the primary data findings of this report, further findings and takeaways 
are pulled from interviews and synthesis of data findings, interviews, and a literature 
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scan. These findings range from the conceptual to the very practical, and are discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 For low-income tenants, code enforcement represents a complicated bundle of 
displacement and health and safety risk regardless of whether a neighborhood is 
gentrifying. In order to consider the relationship between code enforcement and 
gentrification-related displacement, I must first be clear that code enforcement presents 
risks for low-income tenants that are not unique to gentrification. In Making Our 
Neighborhoods, Making Ourselves, George C. Galster details the movement of housing 
units between different housing quality submarkets. He warns that if property owners are 
“unable to secure even minimal prospective rates of return” on their investment even in 
the lowest-income submarket, they might “retire” the property from the housing market 
(Galster, 2019, p. 63). In other words, if a property owner’s profit is lower than the 
“minimally needed operational resources,” they may remove the property from the 
market all together (p. 65). For rental housing in the lowest-income submarket, code 
enforcement represents a threat to tenants by essentially raising the floor of “minimally 
needed operational resources” such that the property owner will be incentivized to 
abandon, demolish, or sell the structure and displace its tenants rather than continue 
operating it at a loss. Or, property owners may respond to code enforcement by making 
improvements that shift the property into a higher-income submarket, which could also 
displace low-income tenants who cannot afford new rents (p. 63). Thus, even in 
neighborhoods that are not gentrifying, code enforcement represents a threat to low-
income tenants, as it can cause properties to “fall out the bottom” of the rental market if 
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they become financially inviable for property owners, or it can incentivize property 
owners to pursue improvements to properties that raise rents. (Although this phenomenon 
could occur in any type of low-income neighborhood, in neighborhoods that are 
gentrifying it would carry more severe incentives for property owners and more risk for 
tenants.) 
Additionally, on an individual basis, enforcement can lead to retaliatory eviction 
against tenants who call in code complaints. In Generation Priced Out’s chapter on the 
struggles of low-income tenants in Austin, TX, Randy Shaw reports that the Austin 
tenants he spoke to “feared being evicted in retaliation for complaining to the city” 
(Shaw, 2018, p. 80). Poor rental protections in the state make it difficult for tenants to 
protect themselves from landlord retaliation (Show, 2018, p. 80; Susan interview, 2019). 
It must be emphasized that the phenomena identified by Galster and Shaw can lead to 
displacement even in neighborhoods that are not experiencing gentrification and 
demographic change. However, gentrification can increase or accelerate these risks, 
which I will now discuss. 
Conceptually, when I ask, “Is gentrification related to an increase in code 
complaints?” I may actually be implying three different phenomena: 
1. Financial pressure on low-income homeowners: As the theory goes, bad actor 
developers abuse complaint-driven code enforcement systems to put extra 
financial pressure on low-income homeowners struggling to stay in place. 
Another version of this theory has code enforcement themselves collaborating and 
putting extra pressure on homeowners in areas experiencing gentrification and 
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neighborhood change. Rumors of this sort of activity have persisted in Austin in 
recent years, which I will discuss in Chapter 2. 
2. Accelerating displacement pressure for low-income renters: All of the 
displacement pressures that code enforcement could contribute to described 
earlier in this chapter (incentivizing property owners to make improvements that 
price out current tenants, large-scale redevelopment, demolition) are accelerated 
in gentrifying neighborhoods. The theory that bad actor developers might abuse 
code complaints as a tool to increase pressure on property owners even more in 
gentrifying neighborhoods could apply to rental properties as well.  
3. Social tension between new and long-time residents: A final theory suggests 
that an increase in code complaints in gentrifying neighborhoods could be caused 
by lifestyle expectations and differences between different communities of old 
and new residents of different races, classes, and cultural backgrounds. This is 
similar to the suggested relationship between gentrification and 3-1-1 nuisance 
calls. In this scenario, a new resident in a gentrifying neighborhood might call in a 
complaint on a long-time resident, due to a different expectation for how to deal 
with interpersonal neighborhood conflict or a different quality of life expectation. 
One Austin Code officer I spoke to suggested that it is even possible in this 
scenario that the complaining person is not calling Code maliciously but rather 
out of concern. The effect that complaints driven by social tension and differences 
would have on actual displacement is not clear, but this would be an effect of 
gentrification worth considering, regardless. 
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On a more practical level, local advocates and experts and even Austin Code 
supervisors agree that improvements could be made to Austin Code’s data hygiene. A 
lack of clear categorical, database-level information on specific complaint and property 
characteristics make developing a better understanding of Code’s impact on vulnerable 
residents extremely difficult, time-consuming, costly, and could lead to lower accuracy. 
Problems with Austin Code’s data internal and public facing tracking of code complaints 
and violations include the following: 
• It is not possible with the currently available code complaint dataset to 
meaningfully assess change over time, as the database-level complaint and 
violation entry log prior to 2016 is not clean or complete.  
• With the current level of categorical complaint and violation data that Code 
tracks, it is difficult to assess which complaints are life and safety threats and 
which are quality of life complaints. Categorical, specific “violation type” 
information, which has recently been made available for “Repeat Offender” 
properties, is needed for all complaints and violations at a database-level. This 
information and level of nuance would be valuable for this report, and for a 
variety of tenant advocacy and support activities. 
• Code enforcement can have different impacts on low-income renters and low-
income homeowners. However, Austin Code does not track whether complaints 
and violations are directed at renter or owner-occupied properties. A 
homeowner/renter-occupancy categorical field would begin to help clarify the 
effects and impacts of code enforcement for these different categories of 
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occupants. Even if the “renter/homeowner-occupied” field were not perfectly 
accurate – for instance, self-reported by complaint caller, and then corrected by 
the code inspector– this information would still begin to give shape to the separate 
impacts that code is having for renter and homeowner populations. 
• Code supervisors report that insufficient database structuring also leads to internal 
inefficiencies: Supervisors report that when searching for eligible properties for 
the department’s Repeat Offender Program (ROP), database queries do not 
categorically and automatically produce a list of properties to be added to the 
program. Rather, queries produce a list of properties that might be eligible, which 
then must be manually inspected and researched to determine a) if they are rental 
properties, and b) whether the violations the properties have incurred are ROP-
eligible. This departmental process inefficiency would be resolved by including a) 
a categorical renter/homeowner field and b) a categorical field of specific 
“complaint types” beyond the general high-level complaint type categories that 
are currently available. 
• The City of Austin Open Data Portal only provides a dataset of code complaint 
entries (CCs). A dataset of confirmed violations (CVs) or violations that have 
resulted in legal action (CLs) is not provided. This may be due to personal 
information that would need to be redacted in the CV notes fields. The same notes 
field is where field inspectors capture information on specific violation type 
(beyond the general violation category). By shifting data capture from the notes 
field (which can’t be shared publicly without time consuming and expensive 
 11 
redaction) to categorical fields for “renter/owner occupancy” and “detailed 
violation type,” Code would make this information sharable, and experts, 
advocates, and the public would be able to get a better sense of impacts and 
frequency of complaints and population types.  
Another major takeaway of this report concerns Austin Code’s mission, and whether 
it is responsive to the needs of both homeowner and renter populations. Interviewees 
from Austin Code can all confidently articulate Austin Code’s current central strategy, to 
“educate, collaborate, then enforce.” However, interviewees provided mixed answers 
when asked how the education and collaboration components of this mission functions in 
a tenant/landlord context, especially in the case of absentee landlords. Though 
community education and collaboration may be commendable priorities in an owner-
occupancy context, in a tenant context, questions like “education for whom?” and 
“collaboration with whom?” do not easily translate. The majority of Austin residents 
facing health, safety, and displacement risks are renters, and Code should better articulate 
how their mission serves these vulnerable residents. 
Informed by interviews, I develop a range of possible reforms that could help Austin 
Code begin to address the issues discussed above. Some of these are administrative and 
could be addressed internally by Code. Others are legislative, and would require action 
from Austin City Council: 
• Two parallel strategic directions – one for renter-occupied properties and one for 
homeowner-occupied properties – in order to better support the divergent needs 
and risks for vulnerable renters and homeowners.  
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• Better training for Code officers, inspectors, and supervisors about gentrification 
and displacement causes, impacts, and pressures on low-income renters and 
homeowners, and the ways that Code could or does contribute to these 
phenomena  
• Reviving consideration of a “rental registration” program, or some other form of 
proactive enforcement, that would require regular, periodic inspection of all rental 
units in the city. (However, one advocate expressed concern that this could 
increase apartment flips and demolitions and increase displacement for low-
income renters.) 
• Data hygiene improvements (discussed above) 
o Categorical, detailed violation types for all complaints (CCs) and 
violations (CVs) 
o A “renter/owner-occupancy” categorical field for all entries 
o Complete basic complaint data entries for years prior to 2016 for change 
over time comparisons, including at minimum the following fields 
§ Complaint number 
§ Complaint date 
§ Complaint type 
§ Complaint priority (if available) 
§ XY coordinates 
Tricky nuances abound in the relationship between code enforcement and 
gentrification. Code could be abused by bad actors, or misused without ill intent by new 
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neighbors with different quality of life expectations. Either activity is difficult to detect 
due to anonymity and/or lack of demographic data for both the person who complains 
and the person who occupies or owns the property that is complained about. For renters 
in Austin’s hot market and Texas’ renter-unfriendly regulatory environment, complaint-
driven code enforcement – really, any code enforcement – is a balancing act between 
unlivable health and safety conditions, and the self-inflicted wound of increasing risk of 
displacement by increasing the likelihood of eviction, “condoization,” or sale and 
demolition. To make matters more confusing, the variety of ways in which code 
complaints and displacement might intersect makes it extremely difficult to identify 
correlation, impact, and meaning.  
A level of accuracy and nuance is necessary when discussing the ways that code 
enforcement does or might contribute to or accelerate displacement in Austin’s 
vulnerable neighborhoods. This study shows simply that the presence of Austin Code is 
very different in gentrifying and not gentrifying neighborhoods, and that this difference 
tracks across all major complaint categories, even those that do not have to do with health 
and safety. Anecdotally, both expert-advocates and Austin Code supervisors believe that 
code enforcement may be misapplied or abused to contribute to residential displacement. 
More and better categorized data will help Code and local advocates develop a better 
understanding of the cause of these discrepancies. Training and operational reform on 
displacement, and on the different pressures and impacts on high-risk renters and 
homeowners will help Code more equitably serve the health, safety, and quality of life 
needs of all residents. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
 
 This chapter grounds the various threads that contribute to this report’s central 
question of whether code complaints and neighborhood gentrification are correlated in 
Austin, and what that might imply. In the first section of this chapter, I survey the recent 
history and context of Austin Code, and describe common themes in the relationship 
between the department and local advocates for tenants and homeowner groups. Next, I 
review three recent studies out of New York City that identify a link between increasing 
3-1-1 nuisance complaints and neighborhood gentrification. I use these studies as a 
methodological precedent for the research in this report. I then briefly consider 
sociological research on the relationship between community diversity and social capital. 
Finally, I review research and common theoretical frameworks concerning code 
enforcement in general.  
CODE ENFORCEMENT HISTORY AND CONTROVERSY IN AUSTIN, TX 
This section provides a brief overview of Austin Code, the city’s code 
enforcement department, and the common concerns about the department levied by 
outside observers in the past decade. The section pulls from departmental documents, 
news coverage, reports and audits, and a statement from community member blog. I also 
incorporate helpful background information that was provided during key stakeholder 
interviews. Although interviews are primarily discussed in Chapter 5, interviewees also 
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provided helpful factual background information that helps “set the stage” for the report, 
which is included here. 
The department that we now call Austin Code is actually a confluence of different 
inspection and enforcement services that were not always housed in the same city 
department. As of 2002, property abatement inspection was under the purview of the City 
of Austin’s Health and Human Services Department, before moving to Solid Waste 
Services (Wright, 2018, slide 18). Meanwhile, Land Use and Structural Condition 
violations were managed first by Development Services, and then by Planning and 
Zoning, before merging with the Property Abatement in Solid Waste Services around 
2007 (Wright, 2018, slide 18). According to interviewee Rachael, code enforcement was 
moved to Solid Waste Services in order to take advantage of and participate in that 
department’s enterprise fund, meaning that Austin utility revenue could be used to fund 
the city’s code enforcement activities (Rachael interview, 2019). During this period, 
several quality-of-life inspection and enforcement services, such as work without permit 
and “Bandit” sign enforcement, were added to the department’s inspection purview 
(Wright, 2018, slide 18). In 2009, the City of Austin launched a standalone department: 
Code Compliance (Wright, 2018, slide 18). Since 2009, many more quality-of-life 
inspection and enforcement services have been added to the department’s purview, 
including “carts at curb” and short-term rental enforcement (Wright, 2018, slide 18). 
Code Compliance rebranded in 2014 as “Austin Code,” which is the name of the 
department today (Wright, 2018, slide 18). 
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In May 2012, Code Compliance faced scrutiny after a second-story walkway 
collapsed at the Wood Ridge Apartments in Southeast Austin, which eventually led to the 
condemnation of the complex and the displacement of more than 160 residents (Coppola, 
2013). Another complex was evacuated in October of that same year, leading to the 
displacement of 60 residents (Ullosa, 2012). Questions about flaws in the city’s code 
enforcement strategy emerged in the wake of these incidents, which led to scrutiny and 
investigation of the Code Compliance department by the University of Texas Law 
Entrepreneurship and Community Development Clinic and the Austin American-
Statesman. Critics argued that reactive enforcement led to vulnerable tenants not calling 
in life-threatening code complaints for fear of retaliation, and that the City did not have 
mechanisms in place to effectively punish and litigate against negligent landlords (Ullosa, 
2012). The 2013 UT Law Entrepreneurship and Community Development Clinic report, 
“An Analysis of Rental Property Registration in Austin,” uncovered dangerous property 
conditions and stories of multiple unaddressed code complaints from tenants in low-
income multi-family rental apartments (Way, Trinh, & Wyatt, 2013, p. 3-4, 29-30). 
 Two proposals to address these concerns emerged from Austin City Council: One 
ordinance called for comprehensive “rental registration” pilot program for specific 
neighborhoods in Austin (and potential for city-wide expansion later on) with proactive 
enforcement for all rental properties (Coppola, August 2013; Coppola, September 2013). 
The other called for the development of a “repeat offender” program that more narrowly 
targeted rental properties with two or more eligible code violations within a two-year 
period (Way, Trinh, & Wyatt, 2013, p. 4). Supporters of the repeat offender program 
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argued that rental registration would be too far reaching and would unfairly burden 
responsible property owners (Coppola, September 2013). Rental registration supporters, 
on the other hand, argued that registration and proactive enforcement would help identify 
and correct problems before they became costly, burdensome, or dangerous (Coppola, 
September 2013). In the end, the latter resolution won the day, and Austin’s Repeat 
Offender Program was born (Coppola, September 2013).  
Austin Code launched its Repeat Offender Program, or “ROP,” in 2013 (Way, 
Sanchez, & Petersen, 2015, p. 1). Program eligibility is determined on “2-5-2” criteria: 
Rental properties are eligible for ROP if they have had two or more notices of violation in 
a 24-month period that were not complied with in a timely manner, or five or more 
notices of violation issues within a 24-month period, or two citations for dangerous health 
and safety conditions within a 24-month period (Way, Sanchez, & Petersen, 2015, p. 3). 
Simply having a high number of complaints does not make a property ROP-eligible. 
Rather, program eligibility is determined by an assessment of confirmed violations within 
a 24-month period. All properties on ROP must pay a fine/fee (Way, Sanchez, & 
Petersen, 2015, p. 3). ROP inspectors are charged with investigating complaints on ROP 
properties within 24 hours, no matter the complaint type, compared to up to five-day 
response times for some complaints on non-ROP properties (Matthew interview, 2019). 
ROP properties also receive annual inspections, which involve the inspection of all 
grounds and structure exteriors, all vacant units, and at least 10% of occupied units 
(Matthew interview, 2019). Although ROP properties are primarily multi-family, the 
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ordinance is not multi-family specific, and there are single-family properties on the 
program (Way, Sanchez, & Petersen, 2015, p. 3).  
 After hearing concerns about dysfunction within the ROP program, the UT Law 
Entrepreneurship and Community Development Clinic produced a follow up assessment 
of the program in 2015. The report found numerous problems and oversights with the 
program, including in identification of ROP properties, violation monitoring and 
stakeholder access to data, and enforcement on ROP properties (Way, Sanchez, & 
Petersen, 2015, p. 6, 11, 15). According to the report, Austin Code’s reliance on 
complaint-driven violations to identify ROP properties resulted in known substandard 
rental properties not being included on the list (p. 6). The report also identifies a 
program-design bias toward larger properties, as these would be more likely to produce 
multiple complaints than properties with fewer units, regardless of livability. The report 
suggests that inefficiencies in Code database management results in poor program 
coordination and data-sharing with other relevant city departments (e.g. Neighborhood 
Housing, Planning and Zoning, utilities, Fire, Police) and stakeholders (p. 11). In terms of 
enforcement, the study found that many ROP properties had failed to register with the 
city, and that violations were not being addressed within required timeframes, and that 
follow-up inspections by code inspectors to determine whether a violation had been 
resolved were not being conducted in a timely manner (p. 16-18). The authors of the 
report argue that, “the persons who suffer the most as a result of these delays are the 
tenants” (p. 18). 
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 In 2016, the City of Austin Auditor conducted general audit of Austin Code, 
“partially due to media attention and resident feedback regarding inconsistent, and 
sometimes conflicting, messages received from Austin Code” (City of Austin, 2016, p. 
1). The audit found issues with a staggering 77% of reviewed cases, stating that “code 
violation investigation, documentation, and resolution practices vary across cases, due to 
a lack of management oversight” (p. iii). The audit notes that the department did not 
engage in regular reviews or monitoring of field activities (p. 6-7). It concluded that these 
oversights and inconsistencies could lead to difficulty managing enforcement, and that 
this ultimately increased safety risk for residents (p. 2).  
 The audit found that “Austin Code does not have an effective process to prioritize 
response to high-risk complaints and promptly address cases that may pose danger to the 
public” (City of Austin, 2016, p. 3). Austin Code responded to this concern with the 
development of the C-TERM “Code Tiered Enforcement Response Matrix” for 
prioritizing response times [Figure 1]. The C-TERM “priority inspection scheduling 
system” assigns all code complaints a number from “Priority 5” (lowest priority) to 
“Priority 1” (highest priority) (Wright, 2018, slide 37). Each priority number is assigned a 
required response time from the department. For instance, Code officers must respond to 
“Priority 2: High Risk-Hazard/Time Sensitive” complaints within 24 hours, whereas they 
only have to respond to “Priority 5: Other Abatement” complaints within five days. 
Notably, high priority C-TERM violation types include short-term rentals, even though 
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the directive for the prioritization system was to address potential “danger[s] to the 
public” (Wright, 2018, slide 37; City of Austin, 2016, p. 3).3 
 
Figure 1: C-TERM Tiered Enforcement Response Matrix (Wright, 2018, slide 37) 
 
The history of concerns and criticisms of Austin Code outline above can be 
generally categorized as resulting from under-enforcement or inadequate. However, 
complaints have also been levied against Austin Code for over-enforcement and/or 
                                                
3 One interviewee expressed concern that under C-TERM, short-term rental inspections would be reviewed 
by Austin Code with a higher priority than pressing health and safety violations affecting vulnerable 
tenants, such as a “hole in the roof” (Susan interview, 2019). Indeed, short-term rentals are a “Priority 2,” 
whereas substandard structural conditions are only a “Priority 3” (Wright, 2018, slide 37). 
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targeted enforcement, which, according to the argument, places additional financial and 
bureaucratic pressure on low-income homeowners. A 2014 KUT article titled “Why the 
City’s Cracking Down on Code Violations in Southeast Austin” outlines Code’s “full 
force” enforcement in the Dove Springs neighborhood and southeast Austin follow the 
collapse of the Wood Ridge Apartments balcony and extensive flooding from Onion 
Creek (Diaz, 2014). Although it would not seem related to the balcony collapse or 
flooding, the article indicates that illegal garage conversions are a main target of this 
increased enforcement, and a major source of anxiety and struggle for low-income 
homeowners. One resident states that he bought his house with a garage conversion 
already in place, and had never considered whether it was legal until confronted by 
Austin Code. At the time of writing, this resident now faced an extensive permitting 
process involving money, time, and possible fines, or else the daunting prospect of 
converting the garage back, which could cost thousands of dollars.  
This financial pinch experienced by low-income homeowners is picked up by 
Montopolis anti-displacement activist Fred McGhee in his blog post “How Austin 
Gentrification Operates in My Neighborhood,” written December 2017. In his post, 
McGhee claims that although Montopolis is becoming an increasingly desirable real 
estate area in Austin, many long-time homeowners in the neighborhood are not selling. 
McGhee claims that would-be flippers, developers, or new owners are responding by 
“submitting complaints to Austin’s Code Compliance department,” including complaints 
against community churches. McGhee considers a property, the former New Jerusalem 
Baptist Church, that was recently cited for “Unsafe Conditions,” noting that it “had not 
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been considered a safety hazard for decades,” and asking, “What changed?” His answers 
to the question: the church now sits on “very desirable real estate.”  
Neither the 2014 KUT article nor the McGhee blog post point to aggregate 
evidence that this sort of additional pressure is being placed systematically on low-
income homeowners in Austin through increased or targeted code enforcement. 
Nevertheless, both pieces make it clear that there is a belief among at least some in 
affected communities that this is a real phenomenon. 
Austin Code received a reset of sorts in 2016, with the arrival of the department’s 
new director, Cora Wright. According to many accounts, Wright has prioritized 
community and equity within the department (Susan interview, 2019; Richard interview, 
2019). Under Wright’s reset of the department’s guiding vision, their new mission now 
includes language about “fair and equitable” enforcement in support of a “safe and 
livable” Austin (Wright, 2018, slide 30).  
According to an Austin Code interviewee, the department continues to take 
criticisms and suggestions very seriously, and has made program improvement efforts in 
response to the 2015 UT Law report and 2016 City audit (Matthew interview, 2019). 
They state that they continue to work with groups currently – for example, the Austin 
Women in Housing Code Working Group – to improve the ROP program and the 
department in general (Matthew interview, 2019; Lacey interview, 2019). The Austin 
Women in Housing Code Working Group, a coalition of “individuals and area 
organizations that collaborate and volunteer their time toward advocating for safe, 
quality, well-maintained and affordable rental properties for the Austin residential tenant 
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community” has enjoyed a seemingly productive collaboration with Austin Code since 
2017, and continues to produce requests and suggestions for program improvements, 
especially concerning the ROP program (Austin Code Department, 2019). However, 
local advocate interviewees continue to hear concerns about the lack of comprehensive 
inspection in the city, and suggestions that code is still not doing enough to intervene 
appropriately and early in substandard multi-family properties (Jennifer interview, 2019). 
Cora Wright’s leadership has led to more equity- and community-focused 
language in Code’s mission and among its officers, but traces of troubling language 
remain. A December 2018 KVUE spot provided a platform for Austin Code to promote 
its 3-1-1 app, designed to reduce 3-1-1 phone traffic and to provide another avenue for 
residents to report code complaints (Adami, 2018). The TV spot even tips its hat to the 
new departmental mission under Wright: An officer explains that although “there are 
certain situations that warrant code inspectors needing to hand out a citation… their 
utmost priority is promoting awareness and how to help residents get the most out of their 
living situations and neighborhoods.” Nevertheless, the spot ends with more ominous 
language, instructing viewers to use the 3-1-1 app to “keep your neighbors in check.” 
In a June 2018 Austin Chronicle article, now-District 1 Councilmember Natasha 
Harper-Madison suggests that “it is not a coincidence” that a historic house in in a highly 
valued area of East Austin has received increased code complaints and inspection 
(Hernandez, 2018). She argues that if a violation were found on the property, it would set 
up the affected low-income residents for failure by forcing them into a confusing, 
obscure, time-coming permitting process. She indicates that the system as-is incentivizes 
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developer abuse, and places barriers in the way of success for low-income residents. In 
terms of Code’s effectiveness at prioritizing community members, the story closes 
ambiguously: The journalist informs the property owner that the case was closed with no 
violation found. The property owner had no idea. Nobody from Austin Code had 
contacted him. 
 RECENT STUDIES ON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN 3-1-1 COMPLAINT CALLS AND 
GENTRIFICATION 
A handful of recent studies attempt to measure conflict between new and old 
residents in gentrifying neighborhoods by measuring increases in 3-1-1 nuisance 
complaints in areas experiencing gentrification-related neighborhood change. The three 
studies discussed here all observe gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City. All three 
studies come to similar general conclusions: they find a higher frequency or notable 
increase in nuisance complaints in neighborhoods that are experiencing or have 
experienced demographic change or overlap. However, these studies find that the cause 
of these complaint increases is difficult to assess due to the complaint anonymity. In 
other words, though researchers and their audiences might assume that the rise in 
complaints is due to newer, wealthier, whiter residents calling in complaints on lower-
income community members of color, they cannot prove this, as 3-1-1 records do not 
record or imply demographic information about the complainer nor the person being 
complained about. Though these studies observe a variety of general nuisance complaints 
rather than specifically code complaints, their methodologies are similar and useful to 
consider. Their findings are informative and relevant, both for what they reveal and what 
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they cannot. Two of the three studies are not peer reviewed, but they nevertheless all 
provide important methodological precedent for this report. 
 In “Contested Boundaries: Explaining Where Ethnoracial Diversity Provokes 
Neighborhood Conflict,” a benchmark peer-reviewed study in the use of 3-1-1 data, 
Joscha Legewie and Merlin Schaeffer compare 4.7 million 3-1-1 complaint calls in New 
York City against an algorithm that detects “edge” neighborhoods, areas where two 
homogenous communities overlap with a fuzzy, contested social boundary. They find 
that complaint calls in the “fuzzy edges between ethnically homogeneous areas” are 26% 
higher than in the homogeneous neighborhoods that they divide (Legewie & Schaeffer, 
2016, p. 149-150).  Though Legewie and Schaeffer are enthusiastic about the analysis 
opportunities that geo-coded 3-1-1 data suggest, they also note the limitations caused by 
call anonymity: “We have no information about callers’ underlying motives and we are 
unable to distinguish between intergroup and intragroup conflict” (p. 151).  
 In late 2018, the podcast Science Vs. conducted their own study comparing 
volume and change over time of 3-1-1 noise complaints in gentrifying, non-gentrifying 
low-income, and non-gentrifying high-income neighborhoods for the episode 
“Gentrification: What’s Really Happening?” Although the study is not peer reviewed, it 
follows sound methodology that is applicable for this report, even though the study’s 
charts presenting their findings are rough and imprecise (Horn, 2018). The study, 
conducted by Meryl Horn, pulls over 600,000 noise complaint over six years from New 
York City’s Open Data Portal. They author uses gentrification categorizations of New 
York City neighborhoods developed by the NYU Furman Center in its “Focus on 
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Gentrification” report. Complaints are normalized to neighborhood population. Horn 
finds that noise complaint calls in gentrifying neighborhoods are higher than both non-
gentrifying low- and high-income neighborhoods, about 700 per 10,000 residents, 
compared to under 600 for low-income non-gentrifying and under 500 for high-income 
non-gentrifying. Furthermore, though noise complaints have increased in all 
neighborhood types from 2011 to 2016, they have increased at a 50% faster rate in 
gentrifying neighborhoods.  
 Another non-peer reviewed study, by BuzzFeed, comes to similar conclusions. In 
the article, “They Played Dominoes Outside Their Apartment For Decades. Then The 
White People Moved In And Police Started Showing Up,” BuzzFeed reporter Lam Thuy 
Vo analyzed complaints about noise, blocked driveways, and illegal conversions of 
apartments. She used a gentrification typology developed by Governing magazine, and 
normalized to census tract population (Vo, 2018). The results of this test find that there 
are 550 complaints per 10,000 people in tracts that have gentrified, compared to 460 per 
10,000 in tracts that have not gentrified and 380 per 10,000 in tracts that are too wealthy 
to gentrify.4 Vo’s study does not indicate the year of analysis, nor does she provide any 
complete or useful change over time analysis. However, her study does helpfully 
augment the data findings with interviews in gentrifying census tracts with both long-
time and new residents. Crucially, Vo anonymously interviews newer white residents 
who admit to using 3-1-1 to complain to avoid confrontation with their new neighbors. 
                                                
4 Vo’s findings in Buzzfeed were originally reported “per 1,000 people,” but have been proportionally 
shifted to “per 10,000 people” in this paragraph for easier comparison with the Science Vs. study. 
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One of these interviewees reports that “he didn’t feel safe approaching his neighbor to 
ask for the music to be turned down.” Another says that he uses 3-1-1 as “a way of 
avoiding conflict.” Though both the Science Vs. and BuzzFeed studies contain 
unfortunate gaps in their data reporting, they both serve as useful precedent and 
methodological road maps for the analysis in this report. 
 All three studies identify lack of information about who calls and who they are 
calling on as the primarily limitation of analysis using 3-1-1 complaint data. Legewie and 
Schaeffer suggest using on-the-ground interviews in study areas to supplement data 
findings. Vo’s BuzzFeed article does just that, and finds anecdotal evidence that newer, 
whiter, wealthier residents are indeed calling in nuisance complaints on demographically 
dissimilar residents. This report does not assess whether any similar correlation in code 
complaints and gentrification is the result of the same phenomenon or a related 
phenomenon. However, the 3-1-1 studies do provide useful methodological precedent for 
this report’s analysis. 
NEIGHBORHOOD DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 
The research on the relationship between anonymous 3-1-1 nuisance complaints and 
gentrification in New York City described above might suggest a relationship between 
increasing neighborhood social diversity and social tension. It is helpful, then, to briefly 
consider research on the relationship between neighborhood diversity and sociological 
concepts like trust, social capital, and social cohesion. Sociologists such as Robert 
Putnam, Robert Sampson, and Mark Granovetter have researched the effects of 
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homogeneous and heterogeneous ties on the development of social capital for decades. In 
“E Pluribus Unum,” Putnam argues that “there is a tradeoff between community and 
diversity” (Putnam, 2007, p. 164). His research shows that in the US, members of 
different ethnic groups living in ethnically and racially diverse neighborhoods tend to 
“hunker down,” leading to lower levels of social capital and social solidarity (p. 137). He 
argues, however, that neighborhood diversity will continue to be a trend in the US, and 
suggests that policy interventions can actually push for cohesion and enhanced social 
capital in these communities (p. 164).  
In “When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust 
and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions,” Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston find that in 
the US and Canada, neighborhood diversity correlates with decreased trust and social 
cohesion (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008, p. 57). However, they also find that 
“individuals who regularly talk with their neighbors” in diverse neighborhoods exhibit 
more trust and cohesion with their neighbors compared to those who don’t. For the 
purposes of this study, this might suggest that the ability for residents in gentrifying 
neighborhoods to mediate interactions with neighborhoods through anonymous 3-1-1 
complaints (as we saw in Vo’s Buzzfeed study interviews) could be linked to lower levels 
of trust, social capital, and social cohesion. In other words, this might support the “social 
tension” theory of why there are more nuisance and/or code complaints in neighborhoods 
experiencing gentrification. 
The research described above does not focus specifically on how housing plays into 
the development or hindrance of trust and social ties. In “Constructing Community Class, 
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Privatization and Social Life in a Boston Mixed Income Housing Development,” Erin 
Michelle Graves studies social life at Maverick Landing, a HOPE VI-funded mixed 
income development in Boston, MA (Graves, 2008, p. 9). Putnam and Stolle, Soroka, and 
Johnston might argue that social relationships and trust at Maverick Landing would be 
fundamentally hindered due to community diversity. Graves argues, however, that 
“formal institutional processes,” such as the prohibition of social activities that would 
increase interaction between dissimilar residents, act as an inhibitor to the development 
of social ties that would otherwise bind diverse groups living in the same building or area 
(p. 10-11). The context of a HOPE VI mixed income development is somewhat removed 
from the question of this report – that is, whether higher code complaints indicates social 
tension in gentrifying neighborhoods. However, Graves’ argument that institutional 
activity, structure, and strategy can influence interpersonal behavior in diverse 
communities helps us understand that an institutional platform such as anonymous 
complaints may be tied up in, amplifying, or even generating interpersonal social conflict 
in diverse neighborhoods, such as the gentrifying neighborhoods in this report.  
 HIGH-LEVEL CODE ENFORCEMENT HISTORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Although this study is an assessment of Austin Code specifically, it is still important 
to situate this report in the context of general code enforcement research by academics, 
law experts, and other researchers. This section briefly outlines key concepts in research 
and thinking about code enforcement. This is not a comprehensive literature review of 
code enforcement research. Although such a review would be useful for researchers and 
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practitioners interested in code enforcement, it is outside the scope of this report. As Jake 
Wegmann and Jonathan Pacheco Bell note, code enforcement is an under-researched 
aspect of the planning discipline, if practitioners and researchers even consider it a part of 
the discipline at all (Wegmann & Bell, 2016, p. 23). The impact of code enforcement on a 
wide range of planning topics, including health and safety, gentrification and 
displacement, equity, quality of life, neighborhood character, and neighborhood conflict, 
is a fertile area for planning research. 
Several key concepts and takeaways that are helpful for framing this report are 
highlighted in the literature discussed in this section. These concepts are important to 
highlight clearly, up front: 
• Code enforcement often involves not just enforcing health and safety violations, 
but also zoning and quality of life violations. Navigating and prioritizing between 
these services proves difficult in theory and practice. 
• Where code enforcement is situated within municipal structure varies from 
municipality to municipality. Code enforcement departments exist in or adjacent 
to planning, police, health services, and housing. 
• Two broad categorical models for code enforcement are reactive enforcement, 
where inspection is driven by citizen complaints or some other “passive” 
mechanism, and proactive enforcement, where all structures that meet certain 
criteria receive regular, periodic inspection. 
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• A tension exists in code enforcement between over-enforcement and under-
enforcement. Both carry the potential for negative impacts on low-income renters 
and/or homeowners. 
• There is also a tension between enforcing minimum health and safety standards 
on one hand, and contributing to unaffordability and displacement pressure for 
low-income residents on the other.  
• The potential to abuse code enforcement to the detriment of vulnerable residents, 
both from within code departments and from developers, has been present in 
conversation around the practice for its entire existence. 
In “The Invisibility of Code Enforcement in Planning Praxis,” Jake Wegmann and 
Jonathan Pacheco Bell provide a helpful wide-scope summary of the history of code 
enforcement. English common law dealing with “nuisance properties” are the earliest 
antecedents of modern code enforcement (Wegmann & Bell, 2016, p. 21-23). Early 20th 
century restructuring of certain uses in certain districts in some cities in the US is an 
antecedent of both code enforcement and zoning practice (p. 23).  
In “Baltimore does not condone profiteering in squalor,” Emily Lieb outlines the 
1941 Baltimore Plan, the first centralized, codified building code enforcement campaign 
in the US (Lieb, 2017, p. 75). According to Lieb, the Baltimore building code 
enforcement Plan was conceived as a response to poor health and safety conditions in 
much of Baltimore’s low-income housing stock (p. 75-77). The plan’s architects sought 
to eliminate the worst blight in the city, while allowing the city to stop short of more 
radical solutions to providing quality housing for low-income tenants of color, such as 
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ramping up public housing and other policies that would operate outside the market. She 
describes the Baltimore Plan as having had the effect of keeping “bad housing in place, 
with the promise that code enforcement would eventually improve it – a promise that 
turned out to be an empty one” (p. 77). Instead, Baltimore Plan code enforcement was 
used as a mechanism of urban renewal in the 1960s, leading to the widespread 
condemnation of low-income urban residencies and the displacement on residents of 
color.  
The Baltimore Plan was an early example of a post-war midcentury boom in code 
enforcement practice in cities around the country (Wegmann & Bell, 2016, p. 23). In the 
1960s, code enforcement was deployed as a major tool for slum clearance as part of 
urban renewal projects not just in Baltimore but around the country (Wegmann & Bell, 
2016, p. 23). The volume of code enforcement agencies around the country continues to 
grow to this day, as does their purview (Wegmann & Bell, 2016, p. 23).  
In Wegmann and Bell’s description, code enforcement officers are “street level 
bureaucrats” who must implement and enforce contradictory imperatives to uphold the 
letter of the law, but to also be responsive to the needs and character of the communities 
they operate in (2016, p. 21). They describe a challenging dynamic for code inspectors, 
who must balance between over-enforcement and running the risk of being “accused of 
being overly punitive and out of step with community norms,” and under-enforcement 
and possibly being “accused of being insufficiently diligent and of allowing poor 
neighborhood conditions to fester” (p. 26). Wegmann and Bell note that code 
enforcement’s primary charge is ill-defined, as their duties potentially include 
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enforcement for health and safety, zoning, and quality of life, all of which may require 
different levels of discretion or strategy (p. 26-27). Not surprisingly, then, the 
departmental location of code enforcement from city to city varies greatly (p. 26). Code 
could be situated within or adjacent to planning, police enforcement, health services, or 
housing.  
Wegmann and Bell indicate that most current code enforcement is performed 
reactively rather than proactively (2016, p. 25). Reactive code enforcement is non-
comprehensive, passive enforcement that relies on some mechanism to decide when and 
where to enforce, for instance complaint driven enforcement, like 3-1-1 calls. In contrast, 
proactive enforcement is comprehensive, regularly scheduled, periodic enforcement of all 
structures, or all structures that meet a set of requirements. Wegmann and Bell suggest 
that the tendency toward reactive enforcement stems from need, as many departments 
face high caseloads and low staffing that make proactive enforcement difficult. They 
point to research by Wilson (1978) that suggests that as with law enforcement, proactive 
enforcement focuses on assertively enforcing the “laws on the books” whereas reactive 
enforcement tends more toward dispute resolution, where the needs of the community are 
considered “even at the cost of overlooking a multitude of infractions” (Wegmann & 
Bell, 2016, p. 26). Certainly, there is potential for code to act more like conflict resolution 
than enforcement, yet I find that the notion that reactive enforcement allows officers to 
use a more “community-focused” lens through “overlooking a multitude of infractions” 
in pursuit of dispute resolution is not supported by how reactive enforcement is 
performed in practice, at least at Austin Code. This topic will be discussed in greater 
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detail in Chapter 5, and the implications of reactive and proactive enforcement will be 
considered in depth throughout this report.  
Another strategic debate, between over-enforcement and under-enforcement, is even 
more difficult to untangle. PolicyLink’s “Equitable Development Toolkit report on Code 
Enforcement” lays out this tension plainly as “a tale of two code enforcements” 
(PolicyLink, 2002, p. 8). In one scenario, vulnerable residents suffer from poor health and 
safety conditions due to under-enforcement, which leads to landlords “maximizing profits 
by maintaining the minimal habitability that tenants will bear.” In the other scenario, the 
city or another bad actor triggers strategic over-enforcement of code to put extra pressure 
on landowners to sell in hot areas for development, effectively “clearing” neighborhoods 
of substandard development and displacing residents. The PolicyLink brief unfortunately 
does not make any distinction between the impacts on renters and homeowners. The first 
scenario would seem to likely affect renters primarily, whereas the second scenario could 
impact homeowners and renters. But the paper makes clear the potential ill-effects of 
both under-enforcement and over-enforcement. The PolicyLink paper also suggests a 
difficult balance between prioritizing minimum health and safety standards for vulnerable 
residents on the one hand, and taking enforcement actions that lead to affordability and 
displacement pressure on the other.  
In Scott Cummings and Edmond Snider’s 1984 article “Municipal Code Enforcement 
and Urban Redevelopment,” the authors argue that code enforcement has directly 
benefited developers to the detriment of low-income vulnerable communities in Dallas, 
TX. Through its mid-1970s Area Redevelopment Plan (ARP), the City of Dallas sought 
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to reverse middle- and upper-class migration to the suburbs through subsidizing higher 
end development in an area of central Dallas (Cummings & Snider, 1984, p. 135-136). 
The authors produce research that suggests that the redevelopment effort was helped 
along by a measurable increase in code enforcement in the area during redevelopment 
compared to before and after, and compared to other areas of Dallas with similar 
demographics and housing stock (p. 142-144). They describe how this general strategy 
might work, arguing that “when landlords are forced by municipal authorities to make 
investments which will bring their properties into conformity with existing housing 
codes, they typically pass along the cost of improvements in the form of rent increases” 
(p. 130). “Physical clearance and demolition” may be another outcome which would 
displace low-income tenants (p. 131). The authors primarily observe code complaint 
frequency over time, and in comparison to non-ARP neighborhoods (p. 135, 139-140). 
They supplement this with city council minutes, newspaper accounts, and interviews with 
public officials, city administrators, and code enforcement personnel (p. 135). They argue 
that “inspector initiated” strategic over-enforcement created a “buyers market” for 
substandard housing in the ARP area (p. 142). In interviews, code enforcement personnel 
indicate that they believe that there was an increase in enforcement in the ARP area, and 
even “admit privately that they were instructed ‘from above’ to increase code 
enforcement activities in the ARP area…” (p. 144). The authors also find that “citizen 
complaints” went up significantly during period just prior to major buyouts and 
redevelopment, then subsided after (p. 143). However, due to complainant anonymity, 
they cannot tell who lodged the complaints. 
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Though the authors cannot go so far as to suggest that the increased complaints and 
enforcement is a “smoking gun” indicating that the city deployed code over-enforcement 
to pressure property owners to sell to the new developer, or that the developer abused the 
anonymous complaint system to pressure landowners, they indicate that that was exactly 
the impact that occurred in the ARP: 
While we do not have data which more clearly illuminate the link between 
anonymous code enforcement and property acquisition, it is clear that as the total 
number of properties acquired by the developer grew rapidly in 1975 and 1976, so 
did citizen complaints. As purchases declined, due to whatever reasons, so too did 
the volume of citizen complaints regarding housing conditions” (p. 143).  
 
Equally damning, they find that “most of the units subject to code enforcement were 
eventually bought by the developer” (p. 144). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The hypothesis of this study’s primary quantitative and spatial examination is as 
follows: 
There is categorical variation in the number of residential code complaints per 
occupied household between census tracts that are vulnerable, susceptible, 
gentrifying, gentrified, and not gentrifying in the City of Austin, with lower code 
complaints in not gentrifying tracts and higher complaints in tracts that are 
vulnerable or in some stage of gentrification. 
In plain language, I am asking: Are there more code complaints in gentrifying areas than 
there are in non-gentrifying neighborhoods? If this discrepancy is established, we can 
then explore the array of possible reasons and rationales for the difference.  
PRIMARY TEST 
As described in this chapter, the primary test for this report is an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) assessing correlation between types of census tracts defined by 
vulnerability to or stage of displacement, and the number of code complaints per 
occupied household for each census tract. The comparison includes every census tract in 
Austin, except for a small number of excluded tracts which will be discussed below. I 
also conducted a series of interviews with Austin Code supervisors and local experts and 
advocates in order to help interpret the results of the test, receive suggestions for 
refinements and additional tests that would be helpful for interpreting results, and to 
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reveal general ramifications and impacts of the relationship between residential 
displacement and code enforcement in Austin. Finally, I used the suggestions from 
interviewees for refinements and additional clarifying tests to complete additional tests 
with alternative parameters. 
The primary data source for this analysis is the “Austin Code Complaint Cases” 
dataset, downloaded from the City of Austin open data portal on January 19th, 2019. This 
dataset contains individual code complaint items dating back to 2004. However, the 
dataset only contains complete code complaint listings for the years 2016, 2017, and 
2018, and is accurate in 2019 up to the date of download. For this study, I extracted the 
2018 entries only5, and observe code complaints for the single year 2018. The dataset 
lists 34,775 total complaint entries for that year. Each complaint listing includes the 
address of the complaint, latitude and longitude coordinates, complaint description, case 
ID, and complaint C-TERM priority number – that is, the priority number between one 
(highest priority) and five (lowest priority) that Austin Code assigns the complaint in 
terms of severity and need to immediately address. 
With the 2018 code complaint data isolated and ready to be mapped and 
compared, I then turn to the question of how to identify, categorize, and quantify 
gentrifying neighborhoods in Austin, and contrast them with neighborhoods that are not 
gentrifying. For this input factor, I adapted the typology used in the 2018 UT report, 
“Uprooted: Residential Displacement in Austin’s Gentrifying Neighborhoods and What 
                                                
5 For comparison and confirmation, I also performed the central analysis for the code complaint year 2016. 
Those results are included in Appendix A. They align generally with the 2018 findings. This supports the 
overall claim of this report, but is not essential to include in the main body. 
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Can Be Done About It.” In “Uprooted,” gentrification is assessed through a formula that 
weighs five factors: decrease over time in percent of people of color, decrease of people 
making at or below 80% Median Family Income, increase in residents 25 and older with 
a Bachelor’s Degree or higher, decrease in percentage of renters, and decrease in 
households with children in poverty (Way, Mueller, & Wegmann, 2018, p. 3). The 
“Uprooted” report applies this analysis, which breaks down tracts into different stages of 
gentrification or vulnerability to gentrification, to all census tracts in the City of Austin. 
These gentrification and vulnerability stages from “Uprooted” are adapted for this report. 
I detail specific categories and how they have been adapted below.  
In Appendix B, I describe in detail the step-by-step process of how I merged these 
data layers for analysis. In summary, I spatially layered code complaint cases on top of 
the “Uprooted” gentrification stage-coded Austin census tracts. Odd tracts, such as the 
Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, were excluded. Then, I overlaid a zoning map of 
Austin to isolate residential code complaints only. 
Next, I adapted and consolidated the tract categories expressing vulnerability to 
gentrification or stage of gentrification. The “Uprooted” report contains nine tract 
categories:  
n/a (i.e. not gentrifying) 
Missing Home Value Data 
Susceptible 
Susceptible (Rent Data) 
Dynamic 
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Dynamic (Rent Data) 
Early: Type 1 
Late 
Continued Loss 
These categories generally represent a spectrum from not gentrifying at all (n/a) to 
susceptible to gentrification (susceptible) to dynamic (early stage gentrification) to late 
(late stage gentrification) (Way, Mueller, & Wegmann, 2018, p. 22-24). 
With nine categories, a concern arose that some of the categories might feature 
such a small number of tracts that any variance between code complaints per occupied 
household in that category could be a coincidence. I therefore collapsed the original 
categories into simplified categories as indicated in Table 2.6 
The dataset was reordered by census tract. A summary row was created 
containing all of the tract level information as well as a sum of the number of code 







                                                
6 A vulnerability tract type, while not appearing in the gentrification typology was included here to indicate 
tracts that are demographically vulnerable to gentrification but not yet gentrifying. The rationale behind this 
decision is described in Appendix C. 
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Tract Type Category Simplification Key 
Original Category Name Condensed Category Name 
n/a Not Gentrifying 
Missing Home Value Data 
Vulnerable (but not gentrifying) 
Vulnerable 
More Vulnerable (but not 
gentrifying) 
Most Vulnerable (but not 
gentrifying) 
Susceptible Susceptible 
Susceptible (Rent Data) 
Dynamic 
Gentrifying Dynamic (Rent Data) 
Early: Type 1 
Late 
Continued Loss Gentrified 
Table 2: Tract Type Category Simplification Key 
 
From these summary rows, the number of code complaints per occupied 
household was generated for each census tract, generating a new column: “code 
complaints per occupied household.” I used “occupied households” as the constant in all 
ANOVA tests. My rationale is that since these tests consider code complaints on 
dwellings, “occupied households” is a more appropriate standard for normalization than 
“residents.” 
Finally, I ran the analysis of variance (ANOVA) using “code complaints per 
occupied household” as my numeric dependent variable and tract “Typology” as my 
group variable. I discuss the results of this test in the next chapter.  
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ADDITIONAL TESTS 
In the supplementary interviews discussed below, interviewees discussed 
additional tests that would be useful for gaining a better understanding of the relationship 
between code complaint frequency and gentrification. Interviewees requested additional 
tests that analyzed the relationship of frequency of specific complaint types and 
gentrification stage. There are 5 main violation categories used by Austin Code: 
Land Use Violation(s) 
Property Abatement 
Structure Condition Violation(s) 
Work Without Permit 
SWS Chp 15 Violation(s) 
Land use violations refer to violations of Austin’s land development (i.e. zoning) 
code. “Property abatement” refers generally to violations having to do with the upkeep of 
properties, such as pulling in trash cans in a reasonable amount of time (“carts at curb”) 
and “tall grass and weeds.” Structural violations refer to violations involving the quality 
of structures themselves, and could range from cracks or holes in roofs to broken 
windows to water leaks that cause mold. “Work without permit” refers to improvements 
made to a property that are not property permitted with the City’s Development Services 
department. “SWS Chp 15” violations are violations of city requirements for recycling 
and composting to be available at premises of a certain size or type (An Ordinance 
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Amending City Code Chapter 15-6 Relating to Solid Waste, Recycling, and Composting 
Regulations, 2014).7  
I conducted an additional ANOVA for each of the first four categories in 
isolation. The last category, “SWS Chp 15 Violation(s),” make up only 23 out of 16,846 
complaints under consideration, so I did not conduct an additional test for this category.  
Interviewees also requested an additional test for single-family dwellings and 
multi-family dwellings in isolation. Some interviewees suggested that displacement 
pressure and risk might impact those in multi-family buildings differently than single-
family. In order to produce this, I returned to the individual ArcGIS “SF” and “MF” 
zoned layers, and exported a dataset for each individually rather than merged. I then 
proceeded through data processing and testing identically as described above. 
Interviewees also suggested that it would be useful to see if certain C-TERM 
priority numbers were occurring more in tracts at certain gentrification stages. C-TERM 
uses a priority rating of “1” to “5,” with “1” being the highest priority and “5” being the 
lowest priority. Just as I conducted an ANOVA for complaint type categories in isolation, 
I conducted ANOVAs for each C-TERM priority number in relation to gentrification 
stage in isolation. 
                                                
7 Aside from the SWS Chpt 15 definition, I wrote all definitions in this paragraph using contextual 
information from interviews and other support documents. Notably, these five categories are not used or 
defined anywhere on Austin Code’s website, Github page, or any other public-facing documentation that I 
could locate.  
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INTERVIEWS  
I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews to augment the results of these 
tests. Seven interviews were conducted in total: four were Austin Code officer 
supervisors, and three were local experts and advocates with specific knowledge about 
and experience with Austin Code. Each participant’s name has been replaced by a 
pseudonym. To find interviewees at Austin Code, I emailed a general Austin Code 
contact address, and was connected with one supervisor. That supervisor then helped me 
identify other supervisors in the department who would be able to provide insight, in a 
snowballing process. Local expert-advocate interviewees were identified through review 
of relevant reports and news coverage. All interviewees, both Austin Code and expert-
advocate, have been given pseudonyms. 
The results of these interviews are described in detail in Chapter 7. Their purpose 
was to help clarify and interpret the results of the quantitative and spatial analysis, and to 
provide additional insight both from within the department and outside it on the potential 
and real impact of code enforcement on residential vulnerability and neighborhood 
change in Austin. As part of the conversations, interviewees identified several useful test 
refinements and additional test suggestions, which I completed and which are included in 
the results in the next chapter. Because new test revisions and clarifications were being 
conducted intermittently based on feedback from the interviews themselves, not all 
interviewees saw the complete results that are included in this report.  
All interviews except one were semi-structured, conducted in person, and lasted 
between 45 minutes and an hour and a half. The exception was an interview with an 
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Austin Code supervisor that occurred spontaneously over the phone and lasted around 20 
minutes. All interviews were conducted in February and March 2019. The interviews 
were all structured around the same basic protocol, which explored common themes and 
lines of questioning. Because the interviews were semi-structured, each interview tended 
to focus on different themes and lines of questioning. Some interviews did not complete 
the entire protocol, or focused on certain aspects but not others, or deviated into relevant 
lines of questioning that were not included in the protocol. I considered the basic protocol 
– which is included as Appendix D – a starting point for framing conversation, but the
interviews themselves were allowed to flow organically. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
 
The ANOVA test results show a stark difference between the percentage of code 
complaints in “not gentrifying, not vulnerable” tracts (3.9% per occupied household in 
2018) and in all of the other tract types, representing tracts that are vulnerable but not 
gentrifying (8.0%), susceptible to gentrification (7.4%), gentrifying (8.9%), and 
gentrified (8.5%) (p<10-5) [Figure 2]. In other words, tracts that are vulnerable to 
gentrification or at any stage of gentrification receive see considerably higher levels of 
code complaints, with some tract types receiving over two times as many code 
complaints as tracts that are not gentrifying.8 
 
n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 1.08-6 
Figure 2: Code complaints per occupied household, tract-level, City of Austin, 2018 
                                                
8 Test results in this chapter are presented as bar charts for visual clarity. I have included tables containing 
precise values for all test in Appendix E. 
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Code complaints per occupied household,
tract-level, City of Austin, 2018 
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It is important to note that vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts also experience 
roughly about as a high a code complaint frequency as the other gentrification stage 
tracts. If we accept the premise that vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts should exhibit 
code enforcement rates approximately similar to those in tracts in stages of gentrification 
and displacement formerly exhibited prior to experiencing gentrification (a rationale 
outlined in the previous chapter), we would expect that the gentrifying tracts experience 
relatively high rates of code complaints but also experienced high rates before they 
started gentrifying.  
TESTS BY COMPLAINT TYPE 
 Several interviewees suggested that it would be important to identify the 
frequency of certain specific complaint types. Some interviewees wished to see frequency 
of very specific complaint categories (e.g. mold, pests, siding, etc.), however those data 
are not available in the current Austin Code open dataset, as will be discussed in Chapters 
5 and 6. The finest grain categorical detail available in the Austin Code open dataset are 
five high level violation type categories: land use violation, property abatement, 
structural violation, work without permit, and SWS Chp 15 violation.9 Table 3 shows the 
overall frequency of each complaint type in 2018. The vast majority of residential 
complaints are in three categories: land use violation (26.4%), property abatement 
(45.7%), and structural violation (24.5%). Work without permit (3.2%) is the only other 
                                                
9 I define these categories on page 43.  
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category with greater than 1% of total complaints. SWS Chpt 15 violations and violations 
with no listed category make up about 0.2% of total complaints, fewer than 40 total 
complaints in the entire year, and were not tested. All test results are p<0.05. Most have 
considerably lower p-values. 
City of Austin 2018 Complaint Type Count 
 Complaint type Count % of Total 
Land Use Violation  4,448  26.4% 
Property Abatement  7,696  45.7% 
Structural Violation  4,127  24.5% 
Work Without Permit  536  3.2% 
SWS Chp 15 Violation*  23  0.1% 
Blank (no description)*  16  0.1% 
Total  16,846  100% 
   *Too small for meaningful analysis 
  
Table 3: City of Austin 2018 Complaint Type Count 
Land Use Violations 
 Land use violation complaints, which make up 26.4% of total residential 
violations for the year 2018, occur over twice as often in gentrifying tracts (2.5%) as not 
gentrifying and early stage categories (1.1 to 1.3%). This frequency increases 
dramatically again in already gentrified tracts (3.4%).  
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n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 0.05 
Figure 3: Land Use Violation complaints per occupied household, tract-level City of 
Austin, 2018 
Property Abatement 
 Property abatement complaints follow the main trend of this study: They occur far 
less in not gentrifying neighborhoods (1.8%) than in any other category (3.4-4.3%). 
However, among the vulnerable and gentrification stage tracts, property abatement 
complaints occur more often in vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts (4.3%) than in tracts 
that are actually experiencing gentrification (3.4 to 3.8%).  
0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable




Land Use Violation complaints per occupied 
household, tract-level City of Austin, 2018
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n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 0.00003 
Figure 4: Property Abatement complaints per occupied household, tract-level City of 
Austin, 2018 
Structural Violation 
 Structural Violation complaints form a sort of bell curve, occurring at a low 
frequency in not gentrifying neighborhoods (0.6%), increasing in vulnerable 
neighborhoods (2.3%) to a peak in susceptible neighborhoods (2.8%) before decreasing 
again in gentrifying neighborhoods (2.2%), and dropping off sharply in gentrified 
neighborhoods (1.1%).  
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n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 2.93-11 
Figure 5: Structural Violation complaints per occupied household, tract-level City of 
Austin, 2018 
Work Without Permit 
 Work without permit complaints, which make up a smaller portion of total 
complaints (3.2%), follow a similar pattern to land use violation complaints. They occur 
at low levels in not gentrifying and early stage tracts (0.1 to 0.2%), before ramping up 
significantly in gentrifying tracts (0.3%) and even more in gentrified tracts (0.5%). The 
ramp up by gentrification stage is even steeper for work without permit complaints than it 
is for land use violation complaints. 
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n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 0.00012 
Figure 6: Work Without Permit complaints per occupied household, tract-level City of 
Austin, 2018 
ISOLATED SINGLE- AND MULTI-FAMILY PROPERTY TESTS 
 Interviewees also suggested that it would be informative to separate out total code 
complaints that were occurring on single- and multi-family properties.  
Single-Family 
 Like every other test, single-family code complaints are at their lowest level in not 
gentrifying tracts (3.4%). Vulnerable tracts experience a frequency of 5.5% before 
dipping to 4.7% in susceptible tracts. Complaints on single-family properties rise 
drastically in gentrifying tracts (7.1%) and again in gentrified tracts (7.7%).  
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n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 0.00014 
Figure 7: Single-family code complaints (all categories) per occupied household, tract-
level City of Austin, 2018 
Multi-Family 
 In one of the most interesting and compelling results of this entire study, multi-
family complaints are low in not gentrifying neighborhoods at 0.8%, rise to 2.7% in 
vulnerable neighborhoods and again to 3.7% in susceptible neighborhoods, before 
dropping to 2.3% in gentrifying neighborhoods and settling again at 0.8% in gentrified 
neighborhoods. This is notable for two reasons. First, not gentrifying and gentrified tracts 
look more similar in this test than in any other. Second, these results indicate that the 
average susceptible tracts (closer to gentrifying than vulnerable tracts) experience a 
considerably higher frequency of complaints than other vulnerable tracts that are not 
adjacent to gentrifying tracts. In the other tests, vulnerable tracts generally trend toward 
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Single-family code complaints (all categories) per 
occupied household, tract-level City of Austin, 
2018
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similar frequencies as susceptible tracts. However, when I test multi-family complaints 
alone, susceptible tracts receive a notably higher complaint frequency.10 
 
n (census tracts) = 177 
p value = 2.76-7 
Figure 8: Multi-family code complaints (all categories) per occupied household, tract-
level City of Austin, 2018 
TEST BY C-TERM PRIORITY NUMBER 
 The ANOVA results for C-TERM priority numbers 1 through 5 did not result 
produce useful findings. The p-values for the C-TERM findings are as follows: 
1 = [no “1s” in 2018] 
2 = 5.16-9 
                                                
10 The multifamily code complaint frequencies observed in this test are normalized “per occupied 
household.” It is possible that there are simply more multi-family units in susceptible tracts than, for 
instance, vulnerable tracts. To attempt to account for this possibility, I tested multi-family zoned complaints 
per renter-occupancy household. This resulted in a nearly identical “bell curve” pattern peaking with 
vulnerable tracts: Not gentrifying: 1.6%. Vulnerable: 3.7%. Susceptible: 5.1%. Gentrifying: 3.5%. 
Gentrified: 1.4%. p-value = 0.00037. 
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3 = 0.2 
4 = 0.14 
5 = 0.01 
Even for the C-TERM priority numbers with admissible p-values (which would not really 
be admissible because the C-TERM results don’t produce valid p-values as a set), the 
categorical results fluctuate meaninglessly. As discussed in Chapter 2, some observers 
suggest that Code’s C-TERM response prioritization system does not prioritize imminent 
health and safety concerns over other less immediately threatening scenarios, such as 
short-term rentals. If C-TERM prioritization does not correlate with severity and risk, 
inconclusive ANOVA test results are not surprising.  
 In the next chapter, interviewees from Austin Code and local expert-advocates 
help interpret these results. These interviewees provide useful context for the 
departmental functionality of Austin Code, on-the-ground information about how code 
enforcement operates in Austin, and frameworks for thinking about code enforcement 
best practice. I discuss the findings from this chapter in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5: Interviews 
 
Seven interviewees helped interpret the test findings described in the last chapter. 
Four Austin Code supervisors and three community advocates with topic area expertise 
were interviewed. Feedback from these interviewees was used to identify follow up tests 
and additional nuance that would help interpret the results. Since one of my interview 
goals was to identify further helpful tests and nuance, not all of the test results described 
in the last chapter were complete and available for all interviews.  
Beyond helping to interpret test results, interviewees provided a wealth of 
information, insight, and interpretation about the potential relationship between code 
enforcement and residential displacement. The following chapter explores the responses 
that interviewees gave during approximately hour-long semi-structured interviews. The 
chapter begins with interpretations by interviewees of the analysis results from the 
previous chapter. Then the conversation expands as interviewees provide broader insight 
about potential relationships between code enforcement, displacement, and gentrification 
for at-risk low-income renters and homeowners. Next, interviewees discuss Austin Code 
data hygiene issues that make it difficult to assess Code’s impact in gentrifying 
neighborhoods and for low-income residents in general, and possible strategies to remedy 
these issues. Then, Austin Code supervisors interpret the mission of the department, and 
all interviewees debate appropriate code enforcement mission, values, and priorities. 
Interviewees describe how the Code Department personnel internally understand their 
role, if any, in residential displacement and gentrification. Interviewees discuss potential 
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for and anecdotal evidence of abuses of the “reactive,” anonymous code complaint 
system in Austin. Finally, interviewees suggest a range of opportunities for reform and 
further research. 
WHAT TEST RESULTS SUGGEST, AND LIMITATIONS TO WHAT CONCLUSIONS WE CAN 
DRAW 
Most interviews were conducted immediately after initial tests comparing all code 
complaints in 2018 to the “Uprooted” gentrification stages. Interviewee suggestions were 
used to hone in on the additional tests and results that were presented in the previous two 
chapters. I discuss the interviewees’ additional insight and observations about the test 
results here. 
Austin Code Supervisor Matthew feels that it is important to clarify that the input 
variable for these results is unverified code complaints rather than verified code 
violations. Matthew confirms the clear distinction between not gentrifying not vulnerable 
tracts (3.9% per occupied household) and tracts that are vulnerable or in a stage of 
gentrification (between 7.4% and 8.9%). He also observes that complaints are highest in 
gentrifying and gentrified tracts (8.9% and 8.5%), noting his surprise, as he would have 
expected a decrease after tracts have gentrified. He states that he is familiar with the 
anecdotal idea that new types of residents moving into a neighborhood might be inclined 
to call in code complaints on individuals or conditions based on cultural difference, but 
does not necessarily draw any firm conclusions from the findings. He suspects this social 
phenomenon may be occurring, but notes that with the ability to call in anonymous 
complaints, this would be very difficult to confirm. He notes that he cannot think of any 
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good reason why land use violations would be comparatively higher in the later stages, 
gentrifying and gentrified. 
Matthew also notes that the age of the housing stock in these areas may play a 
role in differences in complaint frequency: 
It’s accepted that if we have this area that’s 10-years old in its typical construction 
and this [other] area that’s 40-years old in its typical construction, you’re going to 
have more complaints over here [in the 40-year old construction area], because 
it’s older housing stock. But seeing that you might have two areas of similar age 
of housing stock but you have more complaints [in gentrifying areas than non-
gentrifying], now it [would be] no longer the different between the age of 
housing. That [would be] really interesting to see… 
 
Neighborhoods were not differentiated by age of housing stock for this report, so this 
cannot be confirmed here. Also, when different complaint types were broken out, 
gentrifying neighborhoods also had a higher rate of complaints for non-housing stock 
quality-related complaint types. 
Austin Code Supervisor Lacey suspects that structural conditions or zoning 
complaints are due to new types of residents moving in to gentrifying neighborhoods. She 
says that they experience this in the field: In areas that are gentrifying, a new 
owner/resident will call in a code complaint on lower income neighbors who have lived 
in the neighborhood longer, complaining about conditions like “trash in their 
backyard.”11 However, she suggests that these complaints do not come from a place of 
malicious intent: 
                                                
11 Although Lacey first points to increases in structural violation and land use complaints in neighborhoods 
experiencing gentrification, this example, “trash in their backyard,” would be a property abatement 
complaint. 
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I’ve seen a couple neighborhoods in East Austin that are in that position right 
now… some of them are real concerns. Someone might call in and say, ‘Their 
house, the roof has a hole in it, I don’t know how they’re living in it!’ There’s 
genuine concern is for the safety of that person living in it. I don’t believe they’re 
trying to run them out. They see what’s occurring next to them, and they’re like, 
‘I don’t know how they’re living in it, they need to get it fixed or something.’ I 
see [it as] a good faith concern. Most neighbors want to see that everyone’s safe. 
What do people want? A safe community. Community safety includes what a 
community looks like. Lack of blight. Lack of buildings that are abandoned. No 
rodent infestation. I see it more as concern for the people who are there. 
 
Lacey concurs that different age of housing stock in different neighborhoods may be a 
contributing issue: 
Some of the older buildings… we know we’re going to have structural conditions 
problems in central Austin. Those houses have been around forever. And then the 
newer construction problems are going to be different totally. People will say 
sometimes that it’s inequitable enforcement, but it’s just the demand [for different 
types of enforcement] can vary. 
 
Community advocate Jennifer wonders if higher code complaints in areas 
experiencing gentrification or vulnerability are due to newer residents calling code on 
older, low-income residents, or newer higher-income renters calling in on units they 
occupy because they do not see their own displacement as much of a threat. She does not 
argue that the latter is the case, but indicates that if it were, she would see no need for a 
policy reaction. She also wonders how a test like this might control for higher income 
residents calling code on other higher income residents. This, like all complainer 
profiling, would be difficult to accomplish due to anonymity. Like other interviewees, 
she is also familiar with the anecdotal concern that wealthier, newer residents in 
gentrifying neighborhoods call in code complaints on low-income residents. She is 
concerned about newer, wealthier residents calling in complaints on longtime residents 
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based simply on lifestyle differences (similarly to what was suggested in the 3-1-1 studies 
discussed in Chapter 2). She also suggests that it would be good to know which 
complaints are due to residents calling on their own home or unit compared to which 
complaints are due to calling on a neighbor. However, she understands that anonymity 
may preclude this sort of investigation as well. She notes that if this theory were true, it 
could be resolved by proactive code enforcement that doesn’t wait for a complaint to be 
logged to inspect a structure. She notes that other Texas cities such as Houston, Dallas, 
and Fort Worth use proactive inspection rather than 3-1-1 complaint driven inspection. 
When observing that vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts also have a higher complaint 
level than “not gentrifying not vulnerable” tracts, she suggests that perhaps these tracts 
are actually already gentrifying and that there could be time-lag in the gentrification data 
(which was collected from 2012 to 2016). She goes on to suggest that in vulnerable but 
not gentrifying neighborhoods building owners could be purchasing and holding land, 
waiting for land appreciation to come to them, and not maintaining the properties 
appropriately in the meantime, which could lead to higher complaint frequency. Building 
owners in this scenario would be “milking” properties for rent while waiting to sell off as 
the neighborhood housing market heats up. These building owners would have no 
incentive to invest in maintenance and improvements on low-income rental properties. 
She cautions that this is a theory that she has had and that many people have, but that she 
has no definitive proof. Finally, Jennifer brings up the idea that maybe the higher level of 
complaints in these neighborhoods is just the result of housing conditions being worse in 
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these areas. However, as noted above, complaints are higher in these neighborhood for 
non-housing condition related complaints as well. 
INITIAL INSIGHTS INTO DISPLACEMENT RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CODE ENFORCEMENT 
FOR LOW-INCOME RENTER AND HOMEOWNER-OCCUPIED PROPERTIES, AND 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO 
 
The different ways that code might cause or contribute to displacement-risk for 
low-income renters and low-income homeowners are illuminated and given nuance by 
both expert-advocate and Austin Code interviews. However, expert-advocates generally 
had a clearer, more immediate understanding than Austin Code supervisors of the 
different ways that displacement risk plays out for renters and homeowners. Interviewees 
observe multiple threat types, characteristics, and responses. 
Austin Code supervisor Matthew states that he hears about cases from his 
inspectors where enforcement on ROP properties that ends up triggering improvements 
will lead to that end up triggering rent hikes, effectively displacing the previous tenants: 
I can definitely just anecdotally say that… we’ve had properties that entered the 
ROP program… we do a periodic inspection, write up a long list of things, a lot of 
deferred maintenance kind of stuff, and then ultimately the property gets some 
kind of rehabilitation loan or something and they go in and they do a lot of fixing 
up on a lot of these issues, and they’ve got new roofs and new siding and all the 
stairwells and the balconies, and all this stuff is nice and good and sturdy and 
great, but here comes the rent increase to pay for all that stuff, and now all the 
tenants that were there are now facing… “I can’t afford another $300 a month”. 
And so, we did what the ordinance seems to want to have happen, but you have 
this negative consequence on the other side, that the ordinance doesn’t really 
speak to. I think that’s a very interesting dynamic when we look at ROP and [ask] 
“what is success [supposed to look like] in the world of ROP? 
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Code supervisor Richard emphasis that Code cannot treat rental and homeowner 
properties differently, and that ultimately Code’s dealings are and must be with property 
owners. He says that sometimes owners of rental properties will say that some violation, 
“…is the tenant’s responsibility.” He responds, “We don’t deal with leases. We deal with 
code. Leases are a civil manner” and not in Code’s purview. 
Richard also indicates that one point where Code officers do have some flexibility 
is in providing extensions for low-income homeowners who are making a good faith 
effort toward correcting their violation before issuing a citation. “Inspectors are trying to 
work with the homeowners,” he says. 
 Code supervisor Lacey also states that Code’s responsibility is dealing with the 
property owner, regardless of whether it is a renter-occupied or homeowner-occupied 
unit. She notes that by the ordinances that Code follows, the owner is the key responsible 
person for the property, and that whether a tenant or owner is occupying the building, the 
code violation will always go to the property owner.  
 Lacey states that she’s heard about tenants being afraid to call in complaints for 
fear of retaliation from landlords, and she concurs that this probably happens. She 
suggests that Code’s role is to deal with property owners and violations, and that she sees 
tenant-support organizations such as BASTA and the Austin Tenants’ Council as the 
appropriate avenue for supporting tenants dealing with displacement risk. She sees Austin 
Code and tenant support groups as achieving health and safety for tenants in tandem: 
We’re going to do what we have to with that owner and allow the non-profit to 
assist the tenant. We’re coordinated in a way. I can’t really go to an owner and 
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say, ‘Don’t threaten those tenants,’ because that’s not really in the code purview. 
We can document that you’ve not done what you should, you haven’t repaired 
what you should, [but] I don’t want to get in somebody else’s lane. We have 
different roles. 
 
Advocate Susan states that tenants wish to avoid calling in code complaints, 
because they don’t want to deal with the risk of retaliatory eviction from their landlord. 
She says that low-income tenants generally feel a stigma against calling code. She notes 
that a state law does exist that is intended to prevent landlord retaliation against a tenant 
who calls code enforcement. However, according to Susan, that does not prevent 
landlords from retaliating. She says that landlords assume that the law will not be 
invoked often and that they can get away with it. She also notes that the law only covers 
the six months after the complaint, so six months after a complaint a landlord can legally 
evict the person who complained and can even go so far as to tell them that the complaint 
was the cause of their eviction. For these reasons, Susan believes that tenant fear of 
retaliation is legitimate. 
 She states that she hears from Code officers sometimes that the officers 
themselves are nervous about issuing a citation on a rental property because they fear that 
it could lead to tenant displacement if it causes the building to be sold or rehabilitated. 
She sees validity in the fear and does not wish to dismiss it, but she indicates that if a 
code officer does not issue a citation, there is no legal standing for a retaliation claim.  
 Regarding whether increased or proactive code enforcement on rental properties 
would or could lead to such displacement, she responds that if property owners looking to 
flip, rehab, or sell could all do so, they would already be doing it. She says that the 
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housing market is complex enough that this is not a feasible reality for all property 
owners in all parts of town. She says that if the political will existed, she would support 
vigilantly enforcing code at rental properties, and suing and fining bad actors to force 
them out of the market by selling to better owners. 
She suggests that landlords and building managers are incentivized to just do what 
Code asks them to, to the letter of the law, but not to change their behavior or address 
why these buildings are falling into disrepair in the first place. She suggests that the 
issues faced by vulnerable tenants are different issues than for homeowners, and that 
rental properties should be much more strictly enforced, even proactively enforced. She 
notes that Los Angeles’ code department has different officers for renters and 
homeowners who specialize in the different needs of these communities. 
 She agrees that for homeowner properties, code inspectors should make an effort 
to work with people and give them exceptions and extra time to come into compliance. 
She points out that for homeowner properties, “normally it’s the person who’s living 
there who is being harmed, and if they want to live with tall grass and weeds, like, why 
do we care, as a city? So what? What’s the harm?”  
With landlord/tenant relationships, however, she emphasizes that there is a great 
power differential, and she believes that Code’s job is to correct that power differential. 
She believes that if there is a violation on a rental property that Code should enforce 
aggressively, with no discretion, extensions, or other allowances. She understands that 
this might hurt small mom and pop landlords acting in good faith, but argues, “There 
aren’t that many mom and pop landlords out there. And if you are a mom and pop 
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landlord and you can’t maintain your property, then you should get out of the business of 
being a landlord.” 
Expert and advocate Jennifer points to the idea of a tension for renters between 
affordable housing and the right to decent, safe housing. There is no perfect solution to 
this tension, she concedes. She believes in the need to provide basic level of health and 
safety for all properties. She notes that she’s seen adults and children die in low-income 
properties [in Houston] due to unsafe housing conditions, which is unacceptable to her. 
Even if enforcement leads to less affordability, enforcing minimum health and safety 
standards in crucially important for her. She is less concerned about strict or proactive 
enforcement for violations that do not fundamentally affect health and safety. 
In order to mitigate against rising rental costs, she suggests that cities could help 
by installing a voucher program to help soften the blow when rents go up due to 
improvements triggered by code complaints. She also proposes providing a tax abatement 
for properties housing low-income tenants that incentivizes make major improvements 
while keeping rents affordable. 
For Jennifer, addressing this tension between affordability and health and safety is 
a primary reason why it is so important for code enforcement to work together with other 
housing departments to understand potential impacts and ensure that tools and 
mechanisms are in place to assist vulnerable tenants. Code enforcement might have a 
better chance to combat renter displacement collaborating with related departments than 
by working alone. 
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Jennifer describes the displacement risk that Code could cause for low-income 
homeowners as being entirely different than for renters. She says that homeowners might 
face an “economic squeeze” from needing to make unexpected repairs that might increase 
displacement threat. Luckily, Jennifer notes, Austin has a number of home repair 
programs, although she does not know how well these programs function. She believes 
that Code proactively connects low-income homeowners with these programs. This was 
confirmed in interviews with Code supervisors. 
DATA HYGIENE ISSUES, AND OVERALL LIMITATIONS OF CODE DATA 
Local expert-advocates and Austin Code supervisors all point to gaps and 
inefficiencies in Code’s data hygiene that make analysis of the sort done for this report 
difficult to conduct and make meaningful. Local advocates are well aware that these gaps 
and inefficiencies create barriers to understanding the impact of Austin Code on different 
types of residents. Additionally, Austin Code supervisors suggest that these gaps and 
inefficiencies lead to workflow inefficiencies within the department, especially for the 
Repeat Offender Program. 
 Advocate Susan recounts an effort by the Austin Women in Housing Code 
Working Group to procure detailed information about Austin Code violations through a 
public information request. The request was costly and time-consuming because code 
does not keep categorical data about code violation types beyond broad categories like 
Land Use Violations and Structural Violations. Rather, information on specific complaint 
types and characteristics is kept in notes fields written by individual officers. These fields 
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also contain potentially personal information such as phone numbers or gate codes, which 
must be redacted manually. Because this data is costly and time consuming for the public 
to procure due to the need for manual redaction, and because it is not categorical even 
after it has been redacted, it is prohibitively difficult to answer questions such as, for 
instance, how many complaints in the city involve mold, or bedbugs, or unsafe balconies. 
For Susan, the broad categorical fields that are publicly available do not provide 
meaningful detail. She suggests that the code department needs to use a categorical 
“housing condition checklist” that field officers can check off and that would be easily 
distributable to the public. Then, if the comments field needed to be kept private or 
redacted, at least stakeholders could determine patterns associated with specific 
complaint types. She laments that Austin Code does not keep its data in a way that is 
sharable.12 
She also suggests that it is confusing and opaque for Code to have multiple case 
numbers associated with the same case. A complaint starts with a “CC” number, but 
when it’s verified and a notice of violation is delivered, a separate “CV” number is 
generated. She states that this creates confusion. She also says that she has seen some 
evidence in the redacted dataset that indicates that there are CCs that have a “violation” 
mentioned in the notes field, but no associated CV number. This makes her suspicious 
that there are properties that are being overlooked when Code generates the list of ROP-
eligible properties by looking at CV frequencies. 
                                                
12 In April 2019, after this interview was conducted, Austin Code released a new public dataset called 
“Repeat Offender Property Deficiencies” that has a categorical “Deficiency Category” column with finer 
grain categorical violation detail. However, as of writing, this “Deficiency Category” column is only 
currently publically available for this ROP property dataset, not for all code complaints or violations. 
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She notes that Code does not have or share a categorical field that differentiates 
between renter and homeowner-occupied properties. Because of all of the differences in 
vulnerabilities and impacts between renter and owner-occupied properties discussed 
above, she finds this problematic.  
She notes that Code says they are making a good faith effort to fix some of these 
problems, and that Director Wright has been making strides to modernize some of Code’s 
tech systems. However, she indicates that she has not seen the radical shift that she hopes 
for, and feels like it should not be difficult to fix some of these data hygiene issues.  
Expert Jennifer also finds it problematic that categorical information about 
specific complaint types does not exist. She goes on to state that she wishes that there 
was a better way to track who is doing the calling compared to who is being called on in 
neighborhoods experiencing displacement and neighborhood change, but she understands 
that this is not possible data to collect.  
Code supervisor Matthew indicates that beyond the concern from advocates and 
external stakeholders, the lack of more specific categorical data also leads to process 
inefficiencies inside the department. For instance, with the ROP program, Code personnel 
run queries that generate a list of properties that might be ROP eligible. However, 
inspectors cannot automatically tell which properties on the list are renter-occupied, the 
basic requirement for ROP-eligibility. Code staff must manually research each entry on 
the query result list to assess whether it is a renter-occupied property. Also, not every 
code violation is ROP-eligible, so Code staff must manually research and assess whether 
the violations that landed a property on the ROP query list are ROP eligible. He 
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acknowledges the inefficiency of this process, and indicates that Code is working to 
identify solutions to “bottlenecks” in their data collection and sharing process.  
He suggests that it may be challenging to identify the specific categorical 
complaint being made about a property due to partial or inaccurate information received 
online or over the phone when the complaint is initiated. He imagines that once an 
inspector has gone out and verified a violation, that there could be a system for them to 
check off an actual citation to the land development code or international building code, 
for instance. He believes that this information may exist in there system currently, but he 
has not seen it in database form.  
When I ask if there are ever instances where a CC “should” get a CV number but 
doesn’t, he points to a small amount of low risk, non-health and safety concerns, for 
example, “carts at curb” (leaving a trash or recycling bin at the curb for longer than 24 
hours) or tall weeds and grass, that can be addressed with “field issued notices.” Field 
issued notices do not receive a CV. I ask if these CV-less violations could lead to missing 
ROP-eligibility, as Code reviews CV counts for eligibility. He responds that since tall 
weeds and grass could count toward ROP, it is possible that these cases fall through the 
cracks in the current eligibility assessment. If a property had one notice of violation (CV) 
and one field delivered notice on a ROP-eligible violation, that property would not show 
up in the ROP eligibility query that the department runs, as far as he knows. He suggests 
that this is an overall efficiency improvement for Code as a whole, and that field issued 
notices are not about immediate threats to health and safety, even if they are ROP-
eligible. He says that submitting a notice of violation on a non-health and safety-related 
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incident takes a significant amount of time to do, and that field issued notices are a 
helpful workaround that save field officers time, and shrinks the window of time it takes 
for Code to deliver a notice to the property owner. 
CODE’S MISSION, AS IT IS AND AS IT SHOULD BE 
 
Austin Code supervisors understand and can articulate their departmental strategy 
without hesitation: “educate, collaborate, then enforce,” with only minor variation from 
officer to officer. All expert-advocates and some Code supervisors also highlight “health 
and safety” as code enforcement’s primary mission. Code supervisors reflect that 
“equity” has been an additional staple value of the department under Director Cora 
Wright’s leadership. Code staff and advocates present a range of interpretations of these 
values. Expert-advocates suggest that Austin Code’s mission may not appropriately 
distinguish and prioritize the health and safety concerns that affect the city’s most 
vulnerable populations from other non-health and safety related complaints and 
violations. 
 Code supervisor Richard suggests that Code’s mission has improved for the better 
under Director Cora Wright. Wright has instructed the department to focus more on 
community. His interpretation of the current mission is that starting with education before 
moving to enforcement allows for collaboration with the community. He states that Code 
does not wish to “just be hammering people.” He says that he is biased toward leaders 
like Director Wright who have “a people’s heart.” He says, “I’m community oriented. I 
believe if I put on this uniform and I come to the field to play, I’m playing for the 
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community, for the people. I believe that the government is for the people, and what the 
people say. I know that sounds cheesy, but…” 
 He states that Austin Code is “not in the business of taking people’s homes.” He 
says that the department’s focus is on health and safety. He says that if a low-income 
property owner is facing a financial burden caused by Code, they will try to work with 
that person, offering them compliance extensions and connecting them to assistance 
resources that the City provides.  
 Richard states that Austin Code prioritizes equitable enforcement. When asked to 
describe equity, he uses a metaphor: 
Say there’s an apple tree. I tell you guys, “You can have as many apples as you 
want to eat.” You can reach the apple tree but there’s a little old lady next to you 
that’s a lot shorter than you. She can’t reach the apple tree. So, what I do is come 
along to give equity to the situation… It’s already equal, because I already told 
you, “You both can go eat from the apple tree as much as you need,” right? But to 
give equity to it, I might give her something to stand on to make her your height 
so she can reach the same apples that you reach. 
 
 I ask him how this metaphor applies to the work of Austin Code. He responds that 
Code often deals with residents whose finances cannot support code-induced 
improvements, and that in these cases he always tries to not just educate them [and 
enforce code], but also to connect them with outreach programs and resources to help 
them come into compliance. He states, “You might be able to afford to fix your roof or 
walls, but the old woman over here on Social Security, she might not be able to do that as 
fast, so we try to find resources to help [people like her] come into compliance.” 
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 I note that this response sounds homeowner-focused, and he says that it is. He 
says that Code does not extend similar extensions and resources for property owners who 
rent their land. He says, “It’s not the intent for us to fix up your house so you can rent it 
out. Our intent is to make sure the house you’re living in is safe and healthy.”  
 I press again, asking what “equity” means at Austin Code in landlord/tenant 
situations. He responds that this topic is really the purview of groups like the Austin 
Tenant’s Council. He states, “Code doesn’t have the teeth for holding landlords 
responsible, especially when it comes to retaliation.” He says, “From an inspector’s point 
of view, we try to make the environment as healthy and safe as we can. We’re going to 
talk to owners, we’re going to escalate cases to court or to the Buildings and Standards 
Commission. It won’t be an extension situation.” 
 He emphasizes, however, that Austin Code must be a neutral party enforcing the 
law. He expresses frustration that Code cannot do more to help vulnerable tenants: “That 
is hard. I know that it does happen. I can assume that retaliation happens from time to 
time… We press on the homeowner [landlord], ‘You need to give them a livable place to 
stay.’” 
 Code supervisor Lacey concurs that Austin Code’s mission is “education of the 
community, collaboration… and then the enforcement phase.” She believes that 
education must be a consistent and equitable value that Code deploys in every part of 
town in every interaction. She says that many residents do not understand what Code is 
and does. She believes that Code has a duty to work with communities. She says that she 
and her officers ask, “How can we help your community with that? How can we [work 
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together to] preserve your community?” She sees Code’s role as helping “get everybody 
on the same page” in a neighborhood, working with community members to prevent 
having to get to the enforcement phase. Finally, she acknowledges that, “enforcement is 
there. There are going to be homeowners or absentee landowners. They may need the 
extra enforcement. They’re not looking out for the preservation of the occupants or the 
community.” 
 Code supervisor Matthew states that even in landlord/tenant situations, there can 
still be an educational component with the landlord. Even with ROP properties, he says, 
Code has a responsibility to work to educate property owners and managers about the 
codes, regulations, responsibilities, and consequences they need to be aware of, with the 
hope that they will “learn from it and over time we’ll see less issues.” He says,  
ROP leans toward professional-class landlords, but a lot of times it’s [for 
instance] a person who bought a duplex and decided to rent it out and try to gain 
some income out of it… but they’re not necessarily in the industry so to speak of 
running rental properties, so I still see a role for us to play about educating 
landlord about responsibilities from code perspective.13 
 
Advocate Susan expresses concern that Code’s mission, strategy, and actions are 
not appropriately prioritizing health and safety concerns over non-life threatening issues, 
especially for Austin’s most vulnerable residents. She suggests that Code’s C-TERM 
response prioritization system does not appropriately prioritize imminent health and 
safety concerns over other less immediately threatening scenarios, such as short-term 
rentals. She states that C-TERM’s goal should be entirely to prioritize the most 
                                                
13 Contrast this with Susan’s earlier statement that “if you are a mom and pop landlord and you can’t 
maintain your property, then you should get out of the business of being a landlord.” 
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imminently dangerous issues, but that instead Code prioritizes quality of life issues too 
much. She says that in conversation with Code about C-TERM, she was told that a short-
term rental would be prioritized as a “2,” meaning that a Code inspector needed to 
respond in person within 24 hours. However, when she asked whether a tenant with a 
leaky roof in the rain would also receive a “2” priority, she was told that it may be up to 
the operator and Code officer discretion. 
She sees this issue as resulting primarily from political pressure on the issue of 
short-term rentals. She also feels that there is a “culture issue” at Code. She says that 
Code does not see its enforcement as being rooted in the protection of tenants in multi-
family housing. In some other cities such as Los Angeles and New York City, she notes, 
code enforcement is located within the housing department or health department, whose 
service to low-income tenants is at the core of their mission. She states bluntly, “Whereas 
Austin Code doesn’t really have the same type of mission, because they see themselves 
as ‘quasi-APD [Austin Police Department] lite,’ they see themselves as law enforcement. 
That’s a different kind of approach. Less of a problem-solving approach.” She adds that 
she disapproves of calling them “officers,” which she argues connects them to law 
enforcement, instead of helping residents. In some other cities, she notes, the title 
“inspector” is used instead of “officer.” Advocate Rachael is also troubled by her 
perception that Code affiliates itself with police enforcement. She notes that many code 
enforcement officers are ex-police.14 
                                                
14 Several of the officers I interviewed indicated that they were ex-police. 
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Regarding Code’s “education, collaboration, then enforcement” mission, Susan 
says that this type of community building doesn’t work for multi-family rental inspection. 
“What community are you trying to build?” she asks. She sees attempts by Code to help 
build better relationships between tenants and landlords as benefiting landlords more than 
tenants. 
 Expert Jennifer states that the main part of Code’s mission should be to protect 
the safety of residents who lack the means to protect themselves. She says that tenants 
rely on their landlords for safety, and that Code’s primary responsibility should be to 
make sure that tenants are safe and healthy in their homes. She says, “Ultimately the 
mission is to ensure health and safety of residents’ living conditions. To me, it’s 
prioritizing the most dangerous and unsafe rental buildings in the city.” She 
acknowledges that at present Code is responsible for much more than health and safety.  
 Advocate Rachael does not hold much stock in Code spending time prioritizing 
land use or quality of life issues: “It’s just about our preference [as a city] rather than 
actual health and safety issues. That should be treated very differently.” However, 
Rachael suggests that Code and advocates of more proactive health and safety 
enforcement also need to consider the unintended consequences of ramped up health and 
safety enforcement. She says that she used to have more of a black and white moral view 
that building code should be enforced proactively because everyone deserves a safe place 
to live. Now, she wonders,  
…in Austin’s housing market, if we did that citywide… each landlord has a 
different business approach to why they own a property, and many of them are 
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just holding a property until they want to flip them. [They] buy and hold for 5-10 
years and then sell to be redeveloped. So not knowing when you get to a building 
that has issues, what the intention of the landlord is… if they’re just a traditional 
landlord, doing enforcement on them, it would make sense, there’s lower risks 
there. But for ones that are in worst conditions, the ones that are being neglected 
because they’re just investment properties… [If] you start poking at that… are 
you just speeding up the inevitable flip? And do you want to do that? 
 
As a bottom line, Rachael concurs with the other expert-advocates that Code’s 
mission and priority should be about health and safety. She thinks that Code should 
minimize activity in “politically charged” areas like land use, short term rentals, and 
other quality of life violations. She suggests cynically that Code’s attempts at education 
and collaboration are “paternalistic” and “barely scratch the surface” of meaningful, 
community-oriented work. She advocates an “informed, community-led approach,” but 
appreciates that Code would need to develop significant capacities to achieve this. She 
worries that because of Austin’s hot market, Code is inadvertently participating in 
“replacing poverty instead of addressing poverty.” She says that the new approach 
needed for code enforcement –whether strictly within Austin Code or more broadly – 
needs to ask “What are the best tactics and strategies to improve living conditions for you 
and not for somebody else?” She suggests that the city and the department need to 
implement anti-displacement and pro-housing approaches at the same time. She 
concludes, 
It’s still very difficult for me to balance out the big picture, policy-wise, of how 
you balance out strict code enforcement and the unintended consequence of what 
that does in low-income housing. I’m not saying that [strict enforcement] 
definitely displaces everyone, but [I’m hesitant] because of not knowing. Because 
of the power the landlord holds in that situation.  
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AUSTIN CODE’S UNDERSTANDING AND TRAINING ON GENTRIFICATION AND 
DISPLACEMENT 
 
Austin Code supervisors report that the concepts of gentrification and displacement in 
general – and the effect of code enforcement on gentrification and displacement in 
particular – are familiar topics of conversation within the department. However, the 
interviewees indicate that no specific training or instruction about displacement or 
gentrification has occurred within the department. Some code supervisors reflected 
skeptically about whether Code could have a serious effect on residential displacement 
for either low-income renters or homeowners, or else suggested that the solution would 
have to be policy-driven rather than something they could control or manage 
administratively through departmental strategy.  
It is noteworthy that when the terms gentrification and displacement came up, 
most code supervisors tended to think of low-income, single-family homeowners – rather 
than renters, and/or residents living in a multi-family structure – as their “baseline case.” 
This presents a stark contrast with the way that community advocates discuss 
gentrification and displacement: the “baseline case” that advocates use is a multi-family 
renter. 
Code supervisor Matthew indicates that there is no top-down training on 
gentrification and displacement in the Austin Code department, but that staff are aware of 
these issues. He suggests that Code deals with dual pressures: on the one hand needing to 
enforce deferred maintenance issues, and on the other not wanting to trigger 
improvements that will cause a property to flip and displace people. He warns, however, 
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that resolving this tension is not within Code’s purview: “Code enforcement…we’re an 
administrative department. You hand us an ordinance. Our job is to, in the most efficient 
manner possible, try to enforce the provisions of this ordinance…” The consequences of 
those actions, he states, are the responsibility of policymakers.  
Code supervisor Richard concurs that the department does not have a specific 
strategy for dealing with gentrification and displacement, but that officers do talk about it 
among themselves. He also reports that Code officers must stay strictly within 
regulations, but that within those regulations officers will try to work with residents in 
order to avoid displacement. He says, “As long as you’re staying within policy, then 
we’re here to work with the people, to educate them, to get them the resources they need, 
get them where they need to be. I wouldn’t want to be working for an entity that displaces 
people.” 
Code supervisor Lacey says that the issue of displacement comes up for Austin 
Code on a more individual basis rather than at a trend level. She points to practical issues 
that would lead to code-induced displacement, dangerous conditions such as a fire, a gas 
leak, or a serious structural violation. She does not see “the slow impact of displacement” 
in relation to Austin Code, however. She says that she can see why some community 
members point to Code activity as contributing to displacement, but she feels that the 




CODE OFFICER DISCRETION AND DEPARTMENTAL STRATEGIC DISCRETION 
 
The question of whether field officers do or should use discretion in code 
enforcement illuminates a potential disconnect between Austin Code and expert-advocate 
interviewees. In the context of these interviews Code supervisors minimize the discretion 
available to them, arguing that they follow fairly strict guidelines and parameters and 
guidelines. The supervisors indicate that the primary discretionary opportunity they have 
in the field is to determine whether or not to give an extension to building owners before 
advancing cases to legal action. Expert-advocates emphasize that any and all discretion 
on the part of code must be couched in thorough contextual understanding (renter vs. 
homeowner, SF vs. MF, gentrifying neighborhoods, etc.) and with meaningful training on 
specific parameters. Anecdotally, some expert-advocates indicate that they are aware of 
cases where inappropriate or inconsistent discretion has been used, but Code interviewees 
deny this claim. 
All Austin Code interviewees strongly indicate that as an administrative 
department, they follow a strict protocol when responding to complaints that leaves little 
room for individual officer discretion. Supervisor Lacey states, “There’s processes, you 
have to [follow up on] the call, you have to go to the site, you have to validate the 
complaint, once we validate it, we have to notify you of a [remedy] timeline, we have to 
give you a remedy. Those are just processes like any other department has to have.” 
Code supervisor Richard says that when a code officer investigates a complaint, 
they cannot turn a blind eye if they identify a violation. He states that officers must 
validate complaints, which turns the complaint into a violation. He pushes back on the 
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idea of discretion: “We can’t go out and say it’s not a complaint and not do anything 
about it [if we’ve been out and see that it should be validated].”  
Code supervisor Matthew says that each violation-type carries a pre-set number of 
days for a homeowner to comply by making required improvements. He states that 
“there’s not a lot of discretion” concerning the compliance window. According to 
Matthew and Richard, officers do have discretion, however, when it comes to allowing 
extensions for property owners who have not resolved their violation but have clearly 
made a good faith effort toward compliance. However, Matthew says that if the officer 
does not see that the property owner has made a true effort toward resolution, they will 
not offer an extension but will rather move to legal action. Matthew states that ROP 
officers are not inclined to provide extensions to ROP property owners, but may do so if 
they see meaningful progress toward resolution (“For example 10 windows need fixed 
and there’s a contractor out working on it, but there are still six windows to go”). 
Expert-advocate Susan paints a different picture. She suggests that she is aware of 
complaints that should be logged as violations, but are not. She states that she works with 
tenants who say,  
“We called Code and they came out and there was a violation,” but when we 
[advocates] look, there was never actually a violation. Code would say this is a 
good thing: “We just had to talk with the manager and the problem was fixed.” 
But from an advocacy and “tracking bad landlords” perspective, you would want 
to know that there is a violation [even if it was fixed]. 
 
 Expert-advocate Jennifer heard of a situation where Austin Code was cracking 
down on single-family homeowners in the Rundberg neighborhood, thought she does not 
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know why this occurred. She characterizes this as departmental strategic discretion that 
was “really inappropriate” and resulted in the “focus of resources where they shouldn’t 
have been focused.” She argues that if discretion and context specificity are present in 
Austin Code strategy, she would want to make sure that officers are well trained with 
clear standards and priorities, in order to avoid context being decided by the “whims of 
the [individual] Code officer.” She warns that without specific training and guidelines, 
“you can get arbitrary and inappropriate responses.”  
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT SYSTEMS 
 
One Code officer expresses frustration with anonymous complaints and reactive 
enforcement, because he believes that it leads to abuses. Another officer points out that 
even though allowing anonymous complaints does open the door for abuses, it also 
protects vulnerable complainants. One expert-advocate suggests that in her experience 
anonymous complaints by renters do not get taken as seriously by code as complaints by 
identified complainants. 
When I ask Code supervisor Richard whether he perceives a problem with 
anonymous complaint systems, he interrupts, “Yup,” before I even have the chance to 
finish the question. “I hate it with a passion,” he says. He expresses frustration that 
officers are required to follow up on anonymous complaints regardless of the validity of 
the complaint or the motive of the caller. He wishes that 3-1-1 and Austin Code could at 
least log contact information for all complainants, “so we could weed out the profit 
driven complaints.” He continues, 
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Every inspector knows in the back of their minds to a certain extent that we’re 
being used. But at the same time, we have to go out and validate the complaint. 
The law says we have to send notice [if there is an identified violation]. But we 
try to work with them as much as we can to prevent any type of displacement. 
Because that’s not what Austin Code is about. We’re about safety and health. 
That’s it. 
 
Code supervisor Lacey states that she tries to look at the pros and cons of 
anonymous complaints from all sides. She sees how anonymous complaints provide 
protection for the caller. But she also suggests that anonymity can be abused. The abuse 
she has in mind, however, is not bad actor developers putting pressure on property 
owners in hot markets. Rather, she suggests a social phenomenon, where “someone gets 
Code called on them, and then they retaliate and call on their neighbors,” setting off a 
retaliatory chain reaction. She refers to this phenomenon as “bulk calls.” She does not 
feel that bulk calls are unique to one type of neighborhood in Austin, but rather sees the 
phenomenon occurring in all different types of neighborhoods.  
Advocate-expert Susan does not feel that the ability to complain anonymously 
helps tenants: “An anonymous complaint doesn’t help a renter who has an internal issue. 
You know who complained!” She feels that this makes renters who complain vulnerable 
to landlord retaliation. She also claims that because code is not accountable to a specific 
party with an anonymous complaint, they are not as systematically followed up on by the 
department. This claim is squarely opposite of feedback from Code supervisors. For 
instance, in the discussion with supervisor Richard above, he expresses frustration 
precisely because they must follow up on anonymous complaints systematically.  
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ABUSE OF CODE BY DEVELOPERS OR OTHERS 
 
Code supervisors are very familiar with the concept of the bad actor developer 
who abuses code complaints and Austin Code in order to put additional pressure on low-
income homeowners to sell the land. The code supervisors affirmed their belief that this 
activity occurs in Austin. One officer in particular reported extreme confidence that he 
has experienced this phenomenon in the field. 
Code supervisor Michael confidently states that he is aware of “a few” developers 
who lodge code complaints against properties they wish to purchase as part of their 
strategy to put additional pressure on property owners to sell. He suggests that some 
developers do not even bother to make the complaints anonymously, and will admit to 
using this strategy when confronted.15 He says that he is not surprised to see rising code 
complaints in neighborhoods that have historically been “economically disadvantaged 
areas” that now have hot real estate markets. 
Michael states that when inspectors go out to inspect complaints in these 
neighborhoods, residents express concern: “They say they can’t afford to get the house 
fixed. They’ve been living here 30 years. They’re living day-to-day on a fixed income. [It 
could be] children taking care of parents or grandparents.” He says that developers count 
on low-income homeowners not being able to make repairs or failing to request 
extensions, forcing Code to have to take legal action. He says that developers hope that 
homeowners will face so many fines that they are forced to sell, at which point the 
                                                
15 This claim came late in the research and interview process and was not further researched for this report. 
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“developer comes back in and tries to take it off their hands.” Michael states that “it 
happens all the time.” 
 Michael reports that recently he was doing a ride-along with one of his inspectors 
when a resident pulled them over and told them that a person was going door-to-door in 
the neighborhood asking to buy houses. The resident, who was suspicious of the officers, 
suggested that they had hardly seen Code in the neighborhood for many years, but 
suddenly Code had a renewed presence in the community at the exact same time that 
someone was aggressively trying to buy homes there. Michael expresses frustration that 
Code inspectors must see violations through in these situations.  
 I ask Michael if he feels this this tactic is successful for would-be buyers, and he 
responds that it is. He says that he often follows up on these cases to find that the 
violation case has been closed because the house has been demolished or remodeled, and 
that the previous property owner is gone.  
 Supervisor Richard provides similar feedback. He says that sometimes when an 
officer and a property owner have developed trust, that the property owner will “start to 
tell you different things about people want to but their home or letters they receive or 
people they’ve talked to that may have been by three or four times.” Richard cannot point 
to proof that bad actor developers are abusing code complaints as a tool to place pressure 
on property owners, but he points to an “urge [sense]” that he and his officers get when 
they visit such locations and speak with residents. He stresses that in these situations, his 
officers seek to work with the homeowner to come up with solutions that will avoid the 
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homeowner being displaced. He says, “I’m not going to make them move. I’m going to 
bring them up to code, and we’re going to help them do it.” 
 Code supervisor Matthew states that he also has heard about this phenomenon 
occurring in Austin. He says, 
You’ve got someone eyeing the neighborhood as development potential, so one of 
their strategies is to go in and start calling in complaints on these properties to try 
to drive Code activity to try to, I guess, accelerate that turnover. I’ve heard that 
theory before, too. Whether it’s true or not I have no idea.  
 
Matthew reiterates that Code must enforce uniformly across the board, regardless 
of property type. He believes that selectively enforcing would be an unwise strategy: 
From Code’s perspective, our desire is to ensure that we’re enforcing equally 
across the board, that we’re not more likely to file a notice of violation in one area 
versus another. How we treat it isn’t different based on where it’s happening or 
who it’s coming from. If we see this is our violation, then this is our process. 
Trying to get into that realm of reacting differently to complaints in different 
areas or from different sources is a really tricky place for us to be. Selective 
enforcement is something we don’t ever want to be a part of. There needs to be – 
and there is, on some level – an idea of trying to figure out how could we go 
about modifying our processes such that we have as little impact on these 
gentrification issues as we’re capable of. [But] at the end of the day if we show up 
and we see a violation, we have a duty to note the violation and seek correct to the 
violation.  
 
He goes on to point out that most significant changes that would help Code avoid 
accelerating displacement would need to be developed legislatively rather than 
administratively within the department: 
At the end of the day, everything we enforce is something that was passed by 
[Austin City] Council. And so, we have this duty to react the way we’re supposed 
to react when we see a violation of the laws and regulations adopted by our city. 
But at the same time, I think we’re also aware of what the potential impacts of 
those actions can be. But I think where the real struggle and challenge lies is 
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trying to figure out how do we get compliance, while at the same time trying to 
minimize the negative effects of what those actions entail. I don’t think anyone’s 
blind to that problem, but how to solve it is tough, because trying to figure out 
where that line is… You don’t want to drift so far off base that you get accused of 
selective enforcement, but you don’t want to stream so far the other direction that 
it’s absolutely no consideration taken into for type of complaint, how it’s 
affecting the person who’s affected by that violation. I think at some level we try 
to deal with that through our policies of allowing extensions because that allows 
us some discretion in terms of “what are we seeing?” because there’s going to be 
a disparity… If you’ve got a hole in the roof but you are persons of high means, 
your path to compliance is pretty straightforward: You hire a contractor, they fix 
your roof, and the problems done. If you’re someone who has less means, you 
have a harder time getting to hiring a contract and getting the problem fixed. You 
may need longer, or you may need access to some kind of low interest loan. It’s 
clear that the problem is the same, and the resolution at the end of the day is the 
same, but trying to figure out how you create paths to get to that goal that don’t 
negatively impact one more than the other, I think that’s the real challenge that we 
all have. And there’s probably some administrative things that we could try to 
figure out, but at the same time, some of that’s a policy discussion. It’s a 
challenge. 
 
CODE’S UNDERSTANDING OF HOW COMMUNITY IN GENTRIFYING NEIGHBORHOODS 
UNDERSTANDS THEM 
 
Austin Code supervisors stress the importance of being a part of the 
neighborhoods they serve, and finding opportunities for education and collaboration prior 
to enforcement. Officers admit, however, that neighborhoods in gentrifying areas of town 
often react negatively to Code’s presence in the area, and often point the finger at code as 
being a cause of displacement pressure. 
Code supervisor Richard states that “Sometimes the community says they think 
we’re out to get them,” but that, “The last thing we want to do is write a ticket. The last 
thing we want to do is send someone to court.” He says that he encourages his officers to 
be in their community, attend community meetings, and generally be an active part of the 
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life of the area. However, he tells the story of one of his inspectors who attempted to pass 
out Austin Code educational fliers at a community meeting and was told to leave. “They 
didn’t want him there,” Richard says. 
 Code supervisor Lacey thinks that it is important that Code officers have 
relationships and ties to the neighborhoods they serve, but she also acknowledges that 
“there are several neighborhoods that would rather not have the Code department.” She 
characterizes this conflict as miscommunication and lack of understanding. Though she 
says that Code takes “a lot of heat” at community meetings in these neighborhoods, she 
feels that these situations generally end positively, often with residents wanting to work 
collaboratively with Code.  
THE VALUE OF RENTAL REGISTRATION AND PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
 
Several interviewees point to rental registration or some form of proactive 
enforcement as a viable avenue for greater health and safety protection – and possibly 
mitigation of displacement risk – for vulnerable renters. One lone expert-advocate 
expressed trepidation about proactive enforcement and its unknown effects on low-
income renter displacement in Austin’s hot real estate market. 
Several interviewees point to rental registration or some form of proactive 
enforcement as a viable avenue for greater health and safety protection – and possibly 
mitigation of displacement risk – for vulnerable renters. However, one expert-advocate 
expressed trepidation about proactive enforcement and its unknown effects on low-
income renter displacement in Austin’s hot real estate market. 
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Expert-advocate Susan feels that proactive enforcement – such as a rental registration 
program – is generally a great thing. She does have concerns that the proactive 
enforcement that currently exists in Austin, namely the ROP program, does not function 
property. She feels that properties in the program are not being thoroughly and uniformly 
enforced. She would like to see these issues addressed before moving wholesale to 
proactive enforcement. She feels that Code doesn’t always follow up with even non-
anonymous complaints. 
 Advocate-expert Jennifer states that comprehensive, proactive inspection is a best 
practice, and cites other Texas cities that already do proactive enforcement, such as 
Dallas, Ft. Worth, and Houston. She notes that the best programs have evolved to adopt 
tiered systems of inspection based on level of risk. For instance, a brand-new property 
might not need to be inspected regularly right away, whereas a unit built 50 years ago 
would need to be inspected more regularly. She likes that idea of officers being able to 
“get their eyes” on the property without relying on tenants to complaint, as the more 
vulnerable a tenant is, the less likely they are to report due to risk of exposure to landlord 
retaliation. She points to research that supports this finding. She also suggests that 
proactive enforcement would allow Code to get out to properties and push for repairs 
before it’s too late and the property has to be torn down. 
 Expert-advocate Rachael says that she is more skeptical of rental registration now 
than she was when it was on the table for Austin in the early 2010s. She generally likes 
the “registration” aspect, as she sees a need for accurate and comprehensive rent data for 
the city. However, she is nervous about the unintended consequences of rental 
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registration with proactive enforcement. She sees a risk of triggering redevelopment and 
rent hikes in older properties to help property owners cover the cost of code enforcement-
induced improvements, which would then lead to the displacement on low-income 
tenants. Since rental registration would be geared toward older properties, she argues, 
there is a strong possibility that the city’s most vulnerable tenants would bear the costs of 
improvements in the end. She does not feel totally comfortable drawing a line as to which 
outcome is better or worse – tenants living in substandard units, or tenants being 
displaced due to code enforcement-induced rent hikes. 
WHERE CAN IMPROVEMENTS BE MADE? 
 
Beyond the improvements to Austin Code’s departmental data hygiene suggested 
above, expert-advocates suggested several further reforms to Austin Code strategy in the 
context of the department’s effect on residential displacement: 
• Develop two discrete departmental strategies to deal with homeowner units and 
rental units. Possibly even have different officers responsible for managing the 
different designations, as occurs in other cities. 
• One advocate goes even further and suggests that a different set of inspectors – or 
even a different department – should be responsible for health and safety issues, 
as opposed to non-life-threatening nuisance issues. 
• Include and prioritize tenant and other vulnerable voices in the discussion. 
• Regularly evaluate program impacts of code enforcement. 
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 Susan believes that it would be legal to have two programs or divisions within the 
Austin Code department, one for renter-occupied properties and one for owner-occupied 
properties. These two divisions could have different primary strategies, priorities, and 
training. She says, “From a policy standpoint you could say… we’re going to have 
hypervigilant enforcement for multifamily rental properties because these people are 
paying for the use of these buildings and could not correct these things themselves.” 
 She also suggests that two systems, one for owner-occupied properties and one 
for renter-occupied properties, could clarify the different displacement threats and 
impacts on these two populations. She emphasizes that such parallel strategies could help 
focus anti-displacement efforts on low-income renters, who she argues face a far rater 
risk of displacement in Austin in aggregate. She says that although many in Austin have 
an image in their head of a low-income East Austin homeowner, being forced out of 
Austin, 
the number of those people are rapidly dwindling. I think it’s an architype that’s 
not beneficial to the larger conversation. If you look at who’s being displaced in 
Austin. 68% of African American households are renters. 65% of Latinx 
households are renters. 75% of households making less than $50k a year are 
renters. If we give a shit about diversity in this city, if we care about both 
economic and racial diversity in this city, that means we have to focus on renters. 
Punto. That’s it. That means that more than that percentage of our policy priorities 
should be going toward renters. But as a city, when we talk about gentrification, 
we talk about east side elderly homeowner. And that isn’t the displacement 
problem in this city. And that’s not saying that those people should not be helped. 
But that should not be the lens, that should not be the conversation we’re having, 
because that’s not the actual people who are affected. And if we just craft policy 
solutions to keep grandmas in their homes, grandmas die, grandma’s kids inherit 
the property, and grandma’s kids make bank and the city doesn’t recoup any of 
the money that the city invested into that property. What have we done? We have 
another monstrosity built in East Austin. It’s so shortsighted. We’re not talking 
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about long term affordability. I do not think that Code should be going after those 
[low-income homeowner] properties and issuing code violations. We should have 
discretion over that. The thing is though, that property has so much freaking 
equity in it. It’s skyrocketed. Let’s craft programs that capture that, so that as a 
city we’re not throwing tens of thousands of dollars for home repair into a home 
that we’re never going to recoup and where there’s no guarantees of [long term] 
affordability. That’s insane, it just doesn’t make sense. And that person is 
normally higher income than most of the people who are being displaced, and all 
the [low-income] renters have been pushed out long, long ago. 
 
Expert-advocate Racheal expresses frustration that code enforcement has come to 
cover so many different tasks and activities. She says, for instance, that “a land use issue, 
in my mind, is a very different issue than, ‘My roof is going to cave in and kill me,’ in 
terms of urgency.” She wonders if perhaps it would be reasonable to separate out health 
and safety risk enforcement from other aesthetic enforcement at the agency or 
departmental level.  
 Rachael also emphasizes the importance of centering tenant voices in this 
conversation. She says, “If a tenant is living in bad conditions, and they know that if 
[they tried to take code action] that it could likely trigger fixes but also raise rents, they’re 
making that economic calculation…” She worries that making that calculation or 
decision for tenants from the top-down, “forces the ‘you don’t get to live here at all’ 
option” by triggering rent hikes. She warns that without tenant voices in the mix, we 
might implement policies that force tenants out of their homes, and “forces a decision 
that’s the opposite of the one they made.” She acknowledges that these populations are 
marginalized in many ways, and that they are difficult to organize and bring to the table 
for this sort of discussion. She suggests that organizing marginalized tenants would 
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require an incredible amount of resources and skill, which she argues does not currently 
exist in Austin. She says,  
People who already have a social justice mindset say, ‘We need to listen to the 
people.’ Yes, that’s a good value, but to get the right people whose voices are 
actually representative of the people they claim to represent is really difficult. If 
you have to do it you have to do it well. I don’t think we do it well here in Austin. 
 
Jennifer advocates for increased training so that Code officers can enhance 
context sensitivity. She suggests that the training and sensitivities she imagines would 
need to be grounded in “what’s going on,” and would require accurate and appropriate 
data about what problems are occurring, for instance, verifying “if more calls are coming 
in against existing residents by other residents.” She also emphasizes the importance of 
regular departmental evaluation. “How are we doing, what are the impacts that we’re 
having?” If any displacement mitigation interventions were to be pursued at Austin Code, 
she would also want to see evaluation about whether those interventions are working, 
and/or whether they are causing unintended harm. 
CODE’S FEELINGS ABOUT COMMUNITY/ADVOCATE FEEDBACK 
 
One Code supervisor states that he values suggestions and feedback from 
community advocates. He states that he reads and takes seriously reports and audits such 
as the UT Law reports and the City of Austin 2016 audit, and attempts to use this 
feedback for program improvements and revisions: 
Stakeholder feedback is incredibly important to us. That tells us a lot about how 
we’re doing. Where does community feel like we’re missing the mark. Sometimes 
there’s a legal obstacle that I can’t really punch through, but sometimes I’m 
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missing the mark and there is a solution to it. [Some of these are] solvable 
problems. [Maybe, for instance] it’s access to more data, which allows people like 
you to go through and find these interesting complexities that exist, and then you 
make us aware of these complexities, which gives us something to think about 
and consider, and try to use that information in terms of: when we do go through 
some kind of programming design, how do we factor this in, and how can we try 
to capture that? So, all of this information is really helpful.  
 
He notes that Code has to deal with competing interest groups, and describes 
attempting to navigate solutions that will be acceptable to both tenant advocate groups 
like BASTA and Austin Tenant’s Council on the one hand and also groups like the 
Austin Board of Realtors and the Austin Apartment Association on the other. He states 
that an ordinance “is what it is,” but that how a department goes about administering that 
ordinance can “lean one way or lean another,” and that he and the department attempt to 




Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 As the previous chapter indicates, code enforcement – in all communities, but 
especially in communities experiencing gentrification and neighborhood change – 
requires balancing between the needs of homeowners and renters, between reactive and 
proactive enforcement strategies, and between enforcing minimum health and safety 
standards on the one hand and the risk of accelerating displacement of vulnerable 
residents on the other. The question at the center of this report asks how these tensions 
play out in gentrifying neighborhoods in Austin. Does neighborhood change caused by 
gentrification correlate with an increase in code complaint frequency in Austin 
neighborhoods, and if so, what might that indicate? The test results in Chapter 4 show 
that for every single complaint type, complaints are more frequent in tracts that are 
experiencing gentrification than in tracts that are not. Dissimilarities even emerge 
between gentrifying neighborhoods and not-gentrifying neighborhoods that have 
similarly vulnerable populations. This chapter explores and analyzes these variances and 
what they might signify. Background literature from Chapter 2 and stakeholder 
interviews from Chapter 5 provide support for these findings, complicate them, and point 
to takeaways and recommendations for code enforcement reform in support of vulnerable 
residents in Austin. I use the central findings of this report and supplementary interviews 
to make and support the following claims: 
1.  Code complaints occur more frequently in vulnerable and gentrifying 
neighborhoods than in “not gentrifying, not vulnerable” neighborhoods in Austin.  
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2. This difference in complaint frequency cannot be explained by housing stock 
quality and age alone. 
3. Code complaints for multi-family properties are the most frequent in 
neighborhoods that are susceptible to gentrification and adjacent to a gentrifying 
tract, i.e. “next in line” to gentrify. 
4. Land use, work without permit, and overall single-family violation frequencies 
spike in gentrifying and gentrified tracts (i.e. “later stage” tracts). 
5. Property abatement complaints are more frequent in all vulnerable and gentrifying 
tracts, indicating that these complaints do not necessarily trend upward with 
gentrification, but rather are high for all tracts with low-income, demographically 
vulnerable residents. 
6. The test results in this report might support claims of abuse of code enforcement 
by bad actor developers. However, complaint analysis alone cannot directly 
confirm these claims. 
7. Austin Code’s mission and feedback from department supervisors tend to center 
on homeowners rather than renters. The department should consider better 
articulating its service to renters, especially concerning health, safety, and threat 
of displacement. 
8. Code supervisors articulate officer discretion in the field as an equity tool that 
they use to help vulnerable residents. This may be true, but the impact of officer 
discretion would be difficult to measure and presents opportunities for abuse.  
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9. Interviewees have different points of view about tradeoffs between enforcing 
minimum health and safety standards on one hand, and the risk of accelerating 
unaffordability and displacement on the other. Rental registration and proactive 
enforcement could help preserve minimum health and safety standards for 
tenants, but the level of associated risk of accelerating rent hikes and 
displacement is unclear. 
10. Austin Code and local advocate-experts need more data to better assess 
correlations and impacts between code enforcement and residential displacement 
in Austin. Austin Code has an opportunity to improve data hygiene and 
transparency practices in support of these efforts. 
 
TAKEAWAY 1: CODE COMPLAINT FREQUENCY AND GENTRIFICATION CORRELATION 
Code complaints are higher in gentrifying and vulnerable neighborhoods 
than in non-gentrifying neighborhoods in Austin. Every test conducted for this report 
results in a clear distinction between low complaint frequencies in “not gentrifying, not 
vulnerable” tracts, and higher complaint frequencies in tracts that are in various stages of 
gentrification and residential displacement, or vulnerable to it. Tracts that are vulnerable, 
gentrifying, or gentrified receive more code complaints across the board than “not 
gentrifying, not vulnerable” tracts. It was not clear from interviews that this discrepancy 
is clearly understood within Austin Code. Code enforcement frequency in Austin as a 
spatially distinct phenomenon related to gentrification stage requires significant 
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consideration from the department. Austin Code interviewees were not explicitly aware 
of the distinctions in complaint frequency between gentrifying and non-gentrifying areas 
of Austin, however they were not surprised either. Austin Code supervisors are 
anecdotally familiar with the concept that Code is functioning differently in Austin’s 
gentrifying neighborhoods. Yet this understanding does not seem to be systematic and 
strategic. Within the department, this phenomenon lacks data to back it up, and a clear 
strategic path to address it. 
TAKEAWAY 2: THE HOUSING STOCK QUALITY FACTOR 
The discrepancy between complaint frequency in non-gentrifying and 
gentrifying neighborhoods cannot be explained by housing stock quality and age 
alone. Some interviewees wondered if the discrepancy between “not gentrifying, not 
vulnerable” tracts and tracts in gentrification stages might be a function of housing stock 
age or quality. This conclusion might be supported by the fact that “vulnerable but not 
gentrifying” tracts – tracts that are currently home to vulnerable low-income residents but 
are not currently experiencing displacement – tend to function more similarly to other 
tracts that are experiencing displacement than they do to “not gentrifying, not vulnerable” 
tracts. In this argument, the lower quality of the housing stock in historically low-income 
neighborhoods, whether they are gentrifying or not, would be the root cause of the higher 
frequency of code complaints in these neighborhoods, rather than any behavior related to 
gentrification.  
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 However, the results of the complaint type tests would seem to refute this claim 
on two fronts: First, some complaint types increase or decrease significantly between 
gentrification stages. If higher frequency of code complaints could be explained by low-
quality building stock alone, we would not see the rise in complaints for single-family 
homes in later-stage gentrifying and gentrified tracts (7.1% and 7.7% annually per 
occupied household) compared to vulnerable and susceptible tracts (5.5% and 4.7%). We 
would also not expect to see such a well-defined distinction in multi-family property 
complaints between vulnerable and susceptible tracts (2.7% and 3.7%), if housing 
conditions in these tract-types were similarly poor. This differences between tract types 
are ordinal, and not indicative of random variation. 
Second, some complaint types that experience fluctuations in tracts at different 
stages of gentrification are not directly related to housing stock quality at all. In fact, it is 
these non-building condition-related complaint types that experience the greatest 
fluctuation between stages of gentrification. For instance, land use violations, which are 
tied to land development code and not related to housing stock quality, are approximately 
as low in vulnerable and susceptible tracts as they are in “not gentrifying, not vulnerable” 
tracts, at 1.1% to 1.3%, but leap up in gentrifying tracts to 2.5% and again in gentrified 
tracts to 3.4%. Work without permit complaints, which represent a lower share of overall 
complaints, follow a similar pattern with 0.1% to 0.2% per occupied household in not 
gentrifying, vulnerable, and susceptible tracts, then jump to 0.3% in gentrifying and 0.5% 
in gentrified tracts. At a minimum, poor housing stock in all neighborhood types with 
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vulnerable populations cannot alone account for these fluctuations between gentrification 
stages and fluctuations in non-housing quality-related complaint types. 
TAKEAWAY 3: MULTI-FAMILY PROPERTY COMPLAINTS 
Code complaints for multi-family properties are highest in neighborhoods 
that are susceptible to gentrification and adjacent to a gentrifying tract, or “next in 
line” to gentrify. Test results indicate that multi-family properties in neighborhoods most 
at risk of displacement due to their vulnerable populations and adjacency to gentrifying 
tracts – in other words, neighborhoods where code pressure has the highest likelihood of 
resulting in condoization or sale and demolition – receive significantly more complaints 
than in any other type of neighborhood. The increase in complaints for multi-family 
properties between vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts (2.7% annually per occupied 
household) and susceptible tracts (3.7%) would be especially difficult to explain if 
neighborhood change were not a factor. The increase in (not multifamily specific) 
structural violation complaints in susceptible tracts roughly follows this same pattern. If, 
as local expert-advocates report, multi-family tenants are wary of calling in complaints 
themselves, we would not expect to see an increase in complaints as buildings become 
more susceptible to changes driven by market demand, which would increase risk of 
flipping or demolition and cause displacement. If it were true that bad actor developers 
abuse code enforcement to pressure property owners to sell their apartment buildings for 
new development, displacing low income residents, this test result would support that 
claim. 
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The structural violation trend also probably contradicts a theory floated by expert-
advocate Jennifer that complaint increases in gentrifying neighborhoods could be an 
indication of wealthier residents with less fear of displacement calling on their own units. 
If this were the case, we would expect more structural violation complaints in later 
gentrification stages. In fact, we find the opposite. 
TAKEAWAY 4: LATE-STAGE GENTRIFICATION TRACT COMPLAINTS 
Land use, work without permit, and overall single-family violations spike in 
gentrifying and gentrified tracts. As indicated above, land use violation complaints are 
logged far more often in gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods (2.5% and 3.4% 
annually per occupied household) than other neighborhood types (1.1% to 1.3%). Work 
without permit complaints follow a similar pattern, with 0.3% in gentrifying tracts and 
0.5% in gentrified tracts, compared to 0.1% to 0.2% in other tracts. These findings could 
indicate more incompatible use and work without permits in gentrifying and gentrified 
neighborhoods, or the perception of more incompatible use. We may expect more 
development activity in neighborhoods experiencing gentrification and neighborhood 
change overall, which could see a parallel rise in land use violations and work without 
permit. This trend could also indicate that new builds in gentrifying neighborhoods are 
not bothering to follow development standards and protocols.  
These complaints may also suggest social tension between new and old residents 
in neighborhoods experiencing gentrification. Lodging complaints against new builds and 
improvements could be a way for neighbors to vent their frustration or suspicion about 
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change in their community. Code supervisor Lacey suggested that a rise in overall 
complaints in gentrifying neighborhoods could be due to residents calling in complaints 
on new property owners who are making changes on their properties. The land use and 
work without permit complaint findings may support this hypothesis. If Code supervisor 
Lacey’s theory is correct – that those being complained on are actually newer, wealthier 
residents – this would paint the neighborhood conflict tension in gentrifying 
neighborhoods in a different light than some of the community concerns described in 
Chapter 2 would suggest.  
An inverted social tension hypothesis would be that new residents who hold 
different aesthetic and residential quality of life expectations are calling in code 
complaints on long-time residents in these neighborhoods. If this were the case, we might 
expect to also see similar trend upward in gentrifying and gentrified tracts for property 
abatement and structural violation complaints. However, those complaint types do not 
follow this pattern, and peak earlier in the cycle. It is also unlikely that the land use and 
work without permit complaint trend (that peaks in later stages) is an indication of abuse 
of the code complaint system by bad actor developers, as there would be a land-cost 
disincentive to wait so long in the gentrification cycle to start lodging these complaints.  
Without knowing who is complaining on whom, it is difficult to assess why land 
use violation and work without permit complaints are so much higher in gentrifying and 
gentrified tracts than other tracts in Austin. However, the trend is clear and significant. 
One useful follow up test would be to compare the frequency of these complaint types 
against the number or percentage of new builds and improvements in a tract.  
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Overall complaints against single-family properties follow a similar pattern, and 
are significantly higher in gentrifying and gentrified tracts (7.1% and 7.7% annually per 
occupied household) than other tract types (More variation occurs between tract types for 
these test results, but the highest besides those two categories is 5.5%.). Complaints 
against single-family properties in late-stage gentrifying and gentrified tracts could also 
support the “social tension between old and new resident” hypothesis. As with the other 
tests, we can observe the trend but cannot confirm the cause.  
TAKEAWAY 5: PROPERTY ABATEMENT COMPLAINTS 
Property abatement complaints are high in all vulnerable and gentrifying 
tracts. Property abatement complaints occur at a rate of between 3.4% and 4.3% annually 
per occupied household in all vulnerable and gentrification-stage tracts. This is 
considerably higher than the 1.8% frequency in “not gentrifying, not vulnerable” tracts. 
However, a clear ordinal trend does not appear within the vulnerable and gentrification-
stage tracts. This indicates that these complaints do not necessarily trend upward with 
gentrification, but rather are high for all tracts with low-income, demographically 
vulnerable residents. 
TAKEAWAY 6: POSSIBLE DEVELOPER ABUSE OF COMPLAINT SYSTEM 
The test results in this report might support claims of abuse of code 
enforcement by bad actor developers. However, complaint analysis alone cannot 
directly confirm these claims. Spikes in complaint frequency for overall structural 
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violation complaints and multi-family complaints in susceptible tracts – which are 
adjacent to gentrifying tracts and vulnerable to gentrification – might suggest abuse of the 
code complaint system. Advocates suggest that vulnerable tenants generally don’t want to 
call 3-1-1 out of fear of escalation and retaliation, and that even though retaliation against 
tenants is not legal, that doesn’t mean that it does not occur. They suggest that it is 
inherently difficult for low-income tenants to mount a legal case against a landlord in 
such a situation. Given these concerns, it is difficult to imagine multi-family tenants in 
susceptible neighborhoods increasing complaints against their own landlords at a stage of 
neighborhood change in which they face a heightened risk of displacement. 
Some Austin Code supervisors anecdotally suggest that bad actor developers are 
abusing Austin Code’s reactive, complaint driven case generation system. If true, the 
increase in complaints against multi-family properties in susceptible tracts that are 
adjacent to gentrifying tracts could be an indication of this phenomenon. These findings 
may support the claim, and certainly do not contradict it. However, these tests do not 
identify who is doing the calling and on whom. Similar to the studies on 3-1-1 nuisance 
complaints in New York City discussed in Chapter 2, this data limitation keeps me from 
being able to confirm claims of bad actor abuse on a neighborhood scale. 
TAKEAWAY 7: AUSTIN CODE’S MISSION AND STRATEGIES 
Austin Code’s mission and feedback from department supervisors tend to 
center on homeowners rather than renters. The department should consider better 
articulating their service to renters, especially concerning health, safety, and threat 
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of displacement. Austin Code’s mission is “to provide effective community education 
and fair and equitable enforcement of local property maintenance, land use and nuisance 
codes in order to gain and maintain compliance, so that Austin will be more safe and 
livable” (Wright, 2018, slide 31). When asked to articulate that mission, Code supervisors 
respond by highlighting three elements, in order: education, collaboration, then 
enforcement. The “education, collaboration, then enforcement” strategy, as articulated by 
interviewees, focuses more on homeowners than renters. Code supervisors clearly 
articulate education and collaboration strategies in terms of homeowner properties, and 
highlight the value of this community-focused mission in terms of low-income 
homeowners. However, the value of education and collaboration are less clear for tenants 
in rental units. Who is it that needs to be educated, and about what? Who does the code 
department hope to collaborate with, especially in situations where the landlord or 
property owner is not physically present in the community? As local expert-advocate 
Susan states, there is a power differential between tenants and landlords, and a primary 
component of the code enforcement mission is or should be to equalize that power 
differential. It is unclear how education and collaboration work to correct that power 
differential and support vulnerable tenants. 
Crucially, every Austin Code supervisor interviewed for this report prioritizes equity. 
Austin Code supervisors are earnest and authentic in their desire to help vulnerable 
residents. They are sensitive to concerns that they could contribute to displacement, and 
wish to do right by vulnerable homeowners and tenants. If actions they are taking are 
resulting in poor health and safety, residential displacement, or neighborhood conflict, 
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this is not intentional on the part of Code field staff, who seek to “play for the 
community” (Richard interview, 2019).  
However, in their conversations with me Code interviewees consistently used 
homeowners rather than renters as their hypothetical user. Local advocate-expert Susan 
states that the majority of Austin residents facing displacement risk are renters, not 
homeowners. If the prioritization and centering of homeowners is indicative of training in 
the department, this overlooks and undercounts Code’s responsibility to Austin’s 
vulnerable renters. Code’s mission is not clearly renter focused, and Code officers do not 
immediately consider tenants when imagining their interpretation of that mission. 
Austin Code supervisors all indicate that they cannot treat homeowner and renter 
properties differently. They state that they are required to deal with the property owner 
regardless of the type of residence. However, foregrounding and addressing this 
distinction would seem to be vitally important in Code’s efforts to serve and be a part of 
communities, and to perform education and collaboration. Furthermore, expert and 
advocate Susan suggests that Code legally can develop separate strategies for renter-
occupied and owner-occupied properties, or even develop different sub-units or teams to 
serve renter and homeowner populations. These different teams would be able to 
specialize in the impacts and needs surrounding their specific resident type. Advocates 
overall suggest that for renter-occupied properties, the role of code is not to education 
and collaborate, but rather to correct the power asymmetry between landlords and 
tenants. 
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Code’s mission does not satisfactorily distinguish and prioritize resident/tenant health 
and safety over other enforcement. Code also does not have a clear strategy for how their 
“educate, collaborate, then enforce” mission helps renters, who make up the majority of 
Austin’s vulnerable residents. Code supervisors consider the property owner the person to 
“educate, collaborate, and enforce” with, yet it is unclear how this fits in with a) Code’s 
‘equity’ mission, b) Code’s attempts to do outreach in communities, and c) Code’s charge 
– arguably their primary charge – to enforce minimum health and safety standards for 
vulnerable residents. 
TAKEAWAY 8: CODE OFFICER DISCRETION 
Code supervisors articulate officer discretion in the field as an equity tool. 
This may be true, but the impact of officer discretion would be difficult to measure 
and presents opportunities for abuse. The idea from Wilson (1978) in Chapter 2 that 
reactive enforcement allows a code enforcement department to prioritize inspector 
discretion and neighborhood conflict resolution does not reflect the way that Austin Code 
officers report that enforcement works in practice. In practice, Austin Code supervisors 
state that they must investigate and enforce each complaint to the letter of the law. They 
claim that they are not able to use discretion for most steps of the enforcement process in 
the field. (This is challenged by some local advocate and expert interviewees, who 
believe that in practice officers do use discretion.) In effect, then, the potential conflict 
resolution and community responsivity advantages of reactive enforcement described by 
Wilson are not present on the ground. Instead, Austin Code supervisors indicate that 
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reactive enforcement is still “letter of the law” enforcement. Code supervisors indicate 
that the main space in which they may use discretion in decision making is in whether 
they allow extensions for compliance or not. Officers claim that they use extended 
compliance windows as an equity tool that allows low-income property owners more 
time to come into compliance then they would normally receive. They state that extended 
compliance windows are never allowed for landlords, and are often not used for higher-
income residents. Aggregate data on when, how, and why officers use discretion in 
determining compliance extension windows would require considerable further research 
and analysis. 
TAKEAWAY 9: RENTAL REGISTRATION AND PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
Interviewees have different points of view about tradeoffs between minimum 
health and safety standards on one hand, and the risk of accelerating 
unaffordability and displacement on the other. Rental registration and proactive 
enforcement could help preserve minimum health and safety standards for tenants, 
but the level of associated risk of accelerating rent hikes and displacement is 
unclear. Austin Code interviewees report that they are open to rental registration. 
Supervisor Lacey even states that she is confident that a more robust rental registration 
program will be implemented in the near future. Supervisor Matthew emphasizes that 
implementation of a strategy like rental registration would require action from City 
Council and could not be accomplished administratively within the department alone. 
Interviewees indicate that potential abuse of reactive, complaint driven code enforcement 
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and better protection of minimum health and safety standards for vulnerable tenants could 
both be resolved by a proactive enforcement strategy, such as rental registration with 
proactive enforcement. 
Local advocate-experts weigh the pros and cons of a rental registration program 
with proactive code enforcement, and do not all come out on the same side in terms of 
how to balance the trade-offs between improving compliance with minimum health and 
safety standards for low-income tenants on the one hand, and the risk of accelerating 
displacement on the other in Austin’s hot real estate market.  
However, there are two major caveats: First, rental registration, as it would only 
apply to rental units, would not protect the homeowner market from abuses by developers 
or from code enforcement abuse driven by different quality of life expectations between 
residents in different demographics in changing neighborhoods. Second, as expert-
advocate Rachael points out, strict, proactive mandatory minimum code enforcement 
could incentivize owners of low-income rental properties to recoup expenses by flipping, 
condo-izing, or selling for demolition. This could potentially lead to and even accelerate 
displacement of low-income residents. 
However, expert-advocates Jennifer and Susan argue that the value of health and 
safety standards enforcement for vulnerable tenant-residents outweighs the risk of 
displacement. In addition to the effects on the health and safety of vulnerable tenants, not 
having rental registration also leads to informational asymmetry for tenants and 
advocates, poor incentives for tenants to feel safe calling in code complaints, and 
vulnerability to retaliation from landlords.  
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For rental properties in states without rent control, there is an unresolvable tension 
and conflict between housing affordability and, as Jennifer puts it, “the right to decent, 
safe housing.” Jennifer and Susan believe that a minimum health and safety standard 
must be enforced to protect vulnerable renters. Susan feels that if that standard is 
uniformly enforced then at least legal advocates have standing to litigate if retaliation 
occurs. On the other hand, Rachael raises concerns about whether the housing market 
would be able to bear if minimum health and safety standards were enforced proactively, 
or if it would trigger untenable rent hikes that would lead to displacement. She suggests 
that prioritizing tenant voices, though difficult, would at least give tenants themselves 
priority in decision making. 
TAKEAWAY 10: AUSTIN CODE DATA HYGIENE AND TRANSPARENCY 
Austin Code has an opportunity to continue to improve data hygiene and 
transparency practices. Better data hygiene at Austin Code will allow the department 
and local advocate-experts to accurately assess correlations and impacts between code 
enforcement and residential displacement in Austin. Data limitations stand in the way of 
an accurate and thorough assessment of the impact of code enforcement on residential 
displacement. More testing for change over time, violations in addition to complaints, 
and specific violation types would be helpful for improving our understanding of impact, 
and would require new or better data fields and public data sharing from Austin Code. 
Needed information includes more complete code complaint records over time (pre-
2016), a categorical “renter/owner-occupancy” field, categorical “specific violation type” 
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field, and database level access to CV records in addition to CC records. As of April 
2019, Code has released the “Repeat Offender Property Deficiencies” dataset that 
includes a categorical “Deficiency Category” field that provides specific, detailed, 
categorical information about violation types. The department should produce a similar 
column for all complaints and violation, and should make it available to the public. 
More data and better understanding about cases involving renter-occupied 
properties and homeowner-occupied properties would clarify impacts for stakeholders, 
and could grow a better appreciation of the different impacts of code enforcement on 
renters and homeowners for Austin Code officers and leadership, and potentially even 
lead to more appropriate and impactful departmental strategy. Data hygiene issues affect 
the ability of stakeholders to assess the relationship between Austin Code activity and 
residential displacement. Lack of clear and query-ready categorical data about property-
types and specific complaint-types also leads to internal process inefficiencies, for 
instance, when searching for ROP-eligible properties.  
 
 Code enforcement frequency in Austin follows patterns that correlate with 
gentrification and neighborhood change in ways that suggest the possibility that code 
complaints are being abused by bad actor developers or are an indication of social 
conflict driven by demographic change. Austin Code has an opportunity to clarify its 
impact on vulnerable residents – especially vulnerable tenants – and to clarify its mission 
and strategy in regard to supporting renters. The test results indicate that Code is a player 
in the larger ecosystem of neighborhood change in Austin. Whether the higher level of all 
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types of complaints in different stages of gentrifying neighborhoods is a part of cause or 
effect, Austin Code should seek to be an active player in interdepartmental coordination 
around issues of affordability, neighborhood change, and social tension, with departments 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 1, I introduced three claims relating code enforcement and gentrification: 
1. That code enforcement can be abused to place financial pressure on low-income 
homeowners, possibly by bad actor developers. 
2. That code enforcement increases and accelerates risk of displacement for low-
income tenants in gentrifying neighborhoods, by increasing the incentives for 
rental property owners to renovate and raise rents, fully redevelop the property, or 
sell to someone else who will do the same. The same potential for abuse of the 
complaint system by bad actors can occur for renter-occupied properties.  
3. That social tension leads to an increase in code complaints, and that this stems 
from different aesthetic and quality of life expectations and perceptions from 
overlapping demographics in neighborhoods experiencing gentrification. 
In this concluding chapter, I assess whether and how the quantitative test results and 
interviews in this report support these claims in Austin. Then I review the distilled 
takeaways from the last chapter, and turn them into a series of recommendations. Finally, 
I discuss opportunities for further research. 
CODE ENFORCEMENT, GENTRIFICATION, AND LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERS 
What do the findings of this report have to say about the claims that Austin Code 
has increased enforcement in gentrifying neighborhoods, placing additional financial 
pressure on low-income homeowners and increasing their risk of displacement? 
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This report shows that vulnerable and gentrifying tracts in Austin experience 
substantially more code complaints compared to “not gentrifying, not vulnerable” tracts. 
Furthermore, the already elevated frequency of complaints in vulnerable neighborhoods 
rises again in gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods. If gentrifying areas experience an 
increase in visits from the Code Department as gentrification occurs, this might explain 
concern from homeowners about over-enforcement. 
Austin Code does not track or release categorical information on whether its cases 
concern renter-occupied or owner-occupied properties. Therefore, it is difficult to assess 
what proportion of this increase in complaints is occurring on owner-occupied properties. 
By overlaying Austin’s zoning map over the complaints, I was able to isolate single-
family residential complaints, and found that complaints on single-family properties rose 
dramatically in gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods compared to the other 
categories. Additionally, Austin Code interviewees accept the suggestion that bad actor 
developers are abusing the reactive complaint-driven inspection system, and even provide 
some anecdotal support that they see this happening in Austin neighborhoods that are 
experiencing gentrification and displacement. “Single-family properties” is not a very 
helpful proxy for owner-occupied properties, but this result does not on its face contradict 
the claims of vulnerable homeowners. Categorical renter-/owner-occupancy data for 
complaints would be required in order to more accurately pinpoint this trend in terms of 
owner-occupied units only. 
 Although we see an increase in Austin Code activity in gentrifying 
neighborhoods, given the limitations described above, it is difficult to untangle pressure 
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being placed on homeowners from pressure on renters or social tension that is not directly 
driven by development activity. Code supervisors point out that even if low-income 
homeowners are feeling increased pressure from Code, field officers can and do link 
homeowners to programs that provide financial assistance to help bring properties into 
compliance while minimizing or eliminating additional financial burdens for vulnerable 
homeowners. Code supervisors also state that they can and do provide compliance 
deadline extensions for low-income homeowners who are showing a good faith effort 
toward coming into compliance. A final caveat: Some local expert-advocates point out 
that significantly more of Austin’s vulnerable populations are renters than homeowners, 
and that Austin Code should calibrate their priorities accordingly.  
CODE ENFORCEMENT, GENTRIFICATION, AND LOW-INCOME RENTERS 
What do the findings of this report have to say about the claims that code 
enforcement is accelerating displacement pressure for vulnerable tenants in gentrifying 
neighborhoods? 
As with owner-occupied properties, Austin Code data do not indicate whether a 
complaint occurs on a renter-occupied property. Though it is still an imperfect proxy, 
using multifamily residential properties as a stand-in for rental units may be a useful 
starting point. Complaints on multi-family properties peak in tracts that are susceptible to 
gentrification and adjacent to one or more currently gentrifying tract. Were these 
complaints tenant-driven, this would be an entirely counterintuitive outcome: This result 
would mean that tenants are complaining to Code about their own units more when the 
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threat of displacement is the most acute due to high incentives for property owners to sell 
or renovate. Structural violation complaints for all single-family and multi-family 
residential properties also rise in a similar pattern, peaking in susceptible tracts. Change 
over time analysis (which is not possible given the currently available data from Austin 
Code) would be able to confirm that this peak is occurring discretely during this stage of 
gentrification for individual tracts. Though it is not determinative, the patterns presented 
in the structural violation and multi-family test results align with claims of developer 
complaint system abuse. 
Some local expert-advocate interviewees suggest that rental registration with 
proactive enforcement would prioritize the enforcement of minimum health and safety 
standards for vulnerable tenants and remove the potential for abuse of compliant-driven 
reactive enforcement. They argue that protecting the health and safety of vulnerable 
residents is paramount, and that affordability must be addressed by the City beyond the 
purview of code enforcement. However, one expert-advocate suggested that we should 
attempt to develop a better understanding and prediction model of the potential effect of 
rental registration on property owner and developer behavior prior to implementing rental 
registration, in order to avoid accelerating displacement and other unintended 
consequences as much as possible. 
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CODE ENFORCEMENT, GENTRIFICATION, AND SOCIAL TENSION 
What do the findings of this report have to say about the claims that code 
complaints are increasing in gentrifying neighborhoods due to social conflict caused by 
different aesthetic and quality of life expectations between new and old residents? 
 Land Use Violation complaints and Work Without Permit complaints spike in 
gentrifying tracts, and spike even higher in frequency in tracts that have already 
gentrified. The high frequency of these non-health and safety related complaints in later 
gentrification stages is curious. If this were the result of bad actor developers, we could 
perhaps assume that the rise in complaint frequency would occur in an earlier stage of 
gentrification, when land use prices are not quite as high yet. Instead, complaint 
frequency for these types increases significantly in neighborhoods that are already 
experiencing demographic change. This might indicate that this rise of complaints is 
occurring due to social conflict driven by overlapping demographics with different 
aesthetic and quality of life expectations.  
 Crucially, we cannot know who is calling on whom and what callers’ motivations 
are. It is entirely possible that these results suggest that newer, wealthier residents in 
these neighborhoods are calling in complaints on neighbors who have been operating for 
years in current conditions without brining code enforcement into the picture. One Austin 
Code supervisor interviewed for this report suggested the opposite, that this result might 
indicate that longtime residents in these neighborhoods might be calling in more 
complaints on newer residents and developers as they embark on new builds or 
substantial renovations. One key related limitation to these findings is that they do not 
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control for the number of new builds and substantial renovations in each tract, and one 
possible explanation could be that the rise in these types of complaints might simply be 
correlated to the ratio of new builds and renovations. Ruling this correlation out would be 
an opportunity for additional research.  
 If these findings do suggest that social tension between old and new residents in 
gentrifying neighborhoods is leading to an increase in code complaint frequency, many 
new questions emerge, many of which cannot be resolved quantitatively. Who is calling 
on whom? Are these complaints legally and technically valid, or are they linked to 
broader cultural misreading of the built environment? Are complaints a way for older 
residents to vent frustration on new residents and neighborhood change, or do they 
indicate that new residents socially normalize calling code as a way of avoiding direct 
conflict with neighbors? These questions cannot be directly answered from the results of 
this report and would require significant additional research. The findings in this report 
indicate that code enforcement concerning non-health and safety threats is being 
deployed in gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods at a much higher rate than other 
Austin neighborhoods, but many questions remain as to why.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Untangling the swirl of factors that lead to gentrification, residential displacement, 
and neighborhood demographic change is well beyond the scope of code enforcement to 
shape and affect. Yet the findings in this report suggest that regardless of intention, 
Austin Code’s impact and footprint are different on the ground in neighborhoods 
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experiencing gentrification than in other Austin neighborhoods. Code reform cannot and 
will not resolve gentrification and displacement in Austin’s vulnerable neighborhoods. 
But Code can take additional steps to clarify its mission regarding residents in vulnerable 
communities, and to minimize its impact or potential impact on accelerating displacement 
in these communities. The following recommendations point to ways that Austin Code 
might develop its understanding of its role in neighborhoods facing gentrification and 
displacement, and shape its strategies toward greater equity and minimizing negative 
impacts of enforcement for vulnerable populations. Some of these recommendations can 
be implemented administratively, without legislative action from Austin City Council, 
while others would require Council action. 
 
1. Develop two parallel departmental strategies, protocols, and/or officer-
specialization, one for owner-occupied properties, and one for renter-occupied 
properties. Austin Code rightly notes that they enforce on the property, not the 
occupant-type. However, clearly the impacts of enforcement play out differently 
for tenants and owners. Furthermore, interviews for this report suggest that this 
distinction between renter and owner is not necessarily foregrounded in 
departmental activity. If Code wishes to continue to value and prioritize equity 
and community collaboration, it is pivotal that the department be able to react 
with greater sensitivity to the distinction between the impacts of code 
enforcement on renters and homeowners. Differentiating strategic direction in this 
way could improve service for vulnerable renters and homeowners alike.  
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2. Track occupancy status categorically for complaints and violations. Simply 
tracking whether the properties Code officers visit are renter-occupied or 
homeowner-occupied is key to developing greater departmental capacity to react 
to renter versus homeowner needs. Currently Austin Code does not categorically 
tract occupancy status at a database level. Doing so would enhance the 
department’s ability to serve communities equitably. It would assist and enhance 
analysis of code enforcement’s impacts in Austin, both within and outside of the 
department. It would also resolve the procedural inefficiency in identifying ROP-
eligible properties; currently, separating renter-occupied from homeowner-
occupied properties for ROP eligibility is a manual, non-automated process 
requiring Code personnel to research each potentially ROP-eligible property on a 
case-by-case basis. 
3. Continue to improve Austin Code data hygiene and public data availability. 
Austin Code should make the much more specific and categorical violation 
description detail (“Deficiency Category”) that is newly available in the “Repeat 
Offender Property Deficiencies” report available for all code complaints and 
violations at a database level. Make a code violation (CV) database available 
publicly at a database level similar to the current complaint (CC) database. Make 
available a more accurate code complaint and code violation dataset for pre-2016 
complaints to allow for better change over time measurements. If possible, 
include the CC/CV number, data, violation type, priority (if available), and XY 
coordinates. 
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4. Consider and explore policies and strategies that would minimize or eliminate the 
potential for abuse of the reactive code complaint system and prioritize the health 
and safety of vulnerable residents, such as rental registration with proactive 
enforcement. Council, the City Manager’s office, and Austin Code should gather 
and assess best practices and data on impacts of proactive enforcement in hot real 
estate markets. Explore ways to minimize displacement within a proactive 
enforcement scheme. For example, a voucher program might be considered to 
make up the gap in rising rents for low-income tenants after a building owner 
makes improvements triggered by code enforcement. Or, a tax abatement program 
could forgive property taxes for owners who make health and safety 
improvements but keep rents affordable. Prioritize and honor directly impacted 
voices within this this discussion and process. 
5. Clarify how Austin Code’s “educate, collaborate, then enforce” strategy works 
for tenants. Clarify how this strategy prioritizes and helps protect minimum health 
and safety standards for vulnerable tenants. In support of Austin Code’s 
“equitable enforcement” priority, help field officers develop nuance in their 
understanding of this strategy beyond the baseline homeowner-centric 
interpretation of this strategy. Address the fact that education and collaboration 
might not work for tenants the way they do for homeowners, or that they might 
not work the same way. Clarify how community collaboration works in tenant-
occupancy situations where the owner is not physically present in the community. 
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6. Enhance training and education within the department on gentrification and 
displacement. Provide field officers with a conceptual framework and best 
practices for understanding how the department’s work dovetails with these issues 
and may contribute to or amplify displacement pressure for vulnerable tenants and 
homeowners. 
7. Prioritize resident voices in agenda-setting and decision-making, especially the 
voices of those most vulnerable to both poor housing conditions and 
displacement. 
8. Work closely, share information, and collaborate with other equity-focused city 
departments, such as Neighborhood Housing and Community Development, 
Public Health, and the Equity Office. Develop shared goals and strategies with 
these departments to better understanding the impacts of code enforcement on 
vulnerable residents, and to develop shared people-focused strategies and tools. 
Consider the potential of strategic and value alignment with departments that 
prioritize service to vulnerable residents rather than or in addition to other 
enforcement agencies. 
LIMITATIONS 
I have discussed limitations to the findings in this report throughout, but high-
level limitations are worth reviewing as I conclude. Reactive enforcement code complaint 
datasets, like the datasets used in the New York City nuisance complaint studies 
discussed in Chapter 2, carry inherent limitations due to the inability to assess who is 
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doing the complaining, on whom, and why. An increase in code complaints could 
indicate a wide set of behaviors by a wide set of actors. Clarifying these activities is not 
necessarily in the realm of quantitative data analysis, and rather might be best advanced 
through thoughtful, in-depth qualitative and ethnographic sociological research.  
 In the absence of clear occupancy categories, I examined the frequency of code 
complaints in single-family and multi-family zoned areas. Obviously, these are not 
accurate proxies for renter or homeowner occupancy. There are many single-family 
homes that are renter-occupied, and multi-family units that are owner occupied. A 
categorical occupancy status field in Austin Code datasets would allow for more accurate 
accounting of the departments presence at and impact on different occupancy-status 
types.  
 Throughout this report, I use gentrification stage – from “vulnerable but not 
gentrifying,” to susceptible, then gentrifying, and finally gentrified – as a rough proxy for 
change over time. As these are temporal stages that neighborhoods that experience 
gentrification experience, this may be an appropriate proxy. However, better change over 
time analysis of discrete tracts would increase our understanding of fluctuations in code 
enforcement frequency as gentrification and demographic change occur. If a susceptible 
tract 10 years ago behaved differently than a susceptible tract today, this would be 
important information for this analysis. This cannot be tested with currently available 
data, as the accuracy of Code’s publically available database declines prior to 2016 in 
terms of comprehensiveness of entries.  
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 For complaint-type specific tests, I used Austin Code’s broad complaint type 
categories (land use violation, structural violation, property abatement, and work without 
permit). I believe that these tests do separate out specifically health and safety related 
complaints (e.g., structural violation) from more aesthetic or at the least not directly 
health and safety-threatening complaints (e.g. land use violation). Nevertheless, these 
tests lack nuance as to individual complaint type characteristics. Any one of these broad 
categories contains a multitude of individual complaint types. A field containing 
categorical data on more specific complaint types and characteristics would allow for 
more nuanced testing. 
 Neighborhood change occurs quickly. The tract-level gentrification stage 
categorizations from the “Uprooted” report that were used for the tests in this report are 
mostly derived from ACS data collected between 2012 and 2016. The code complaint 
data is from the year 2018.16 The experience and even the measureable change occurring 
on the ground in these neighborhoods may be greatly changed or accelerated since these 
data were collected. For instance, neighborhoods that were susceptible to gentrification in 
2016 may be actively gentrifying now. 
 Interviews in this report are limited both in quantity and scope. I specifically 
sought out interview participation from both Austin Code officers and also local 
advocate-experts who had experience with code enforcement-related issues. I did not, 
however, seek out interviews with other key stakeholder groups. Other voices that would 
                                                
16 I also tested 2016 code complaint data to determine the appropriateness of comparing 2016 gentrification 
stage data with 2018 code complaint data. Both the 2016 and 2018 code complaint data followed similar 
spatial and frequency patterns. This process is detailed in Appendix A.  
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provide critical insight for this research include directly impacted tenants, directly 
impacted vulnerable homeowners, new residents in gentrifying neighborhoods, and real 
estate development stakeholders.  
FURTHER RESEARCH 
As discussed in the sections above, better categorical data and more data in 
general from Austin Code would allow for additional clarifying testing. Historical data 
would allow further research into tract-level change over time in code enforcement 
frequency. Categorical occupancy data would allow us to test whether complaints on 
renter-occupied and owner-occupied units follow similar patterns to those found in the 
test results in this report. With more nuanced complaint type details, we could explore the 
impact and frequency of different types of complaints on different property types and in 
different tract types. A more diverse set of interviewees could lead to a broader 
understanding of these phenomena and their interpretation by different stakeholder 
groups.  
Furthermore, it would be helpful to compare the results of these tests in Austin to 
other cities that possess similarities and differences in terms of baseline demographics 
and neighborhood change patterns. The results of these tests in Austin could be compared 
against results in cities with proactive enforcement, or in cities with rent control. Rent 
control in particular would radically shift the underpinning dynamics that lead to the 
findings in this report. 
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 I took inspiration for this report from the three studies discussed in Chapter 2 that 
compared neighborhood change and 3-1-1 nuisance complaints. However, I did not 
conduct a general 3-1-1 nuisance complaint comparison for Austin. To my knowledge no 
such report has been produced. Such a study would be interesting generally, but it would 
also be useful to compare the results of a nuisance/gentrification comparison against 
these code complaint/gentrification comparisons. I embarked on this study with the 
suspicion that code complaints might follow similar patterns to the 3-1-1 studies. 
However, do they in fact follow measurably similar patterns? How are they similar and 
how are they different? 
Though it is well beyond the scope of this report, there appears to be a general 
need for more contemporary research, analysis, and best practice case studies on code 
enforcement and its impacts. Code enforcement functions in some ways as an 
“implementation” apparatus of city planning, and as indicated in this report, may 
additionally contribute to the direct shaping of urban development patterns. These 
functions, how code departments operate and define missions and goals in different cities, 
and the intended and unintended impact of code enforcement in American communities, 
are all ripe for further research contributions. 
 
The findings in this report indicate that code complaints for all complaint types 
occur more frequently in gentrifying and vulnerable neighborhoods than in neighborhood 
that are not gentrifying and not vulnerable. Austin Code, the City of Austin, and 
community stakeholder have an opportunity to further consider the causes and impacts of 
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this disparate enforcement activity, and to develop more nuanced strategies to manage the 
impact of enforcement on different occupancy types, and contribute to displacement 
mitigation. In this way, Austin Code may grow to better serve both vulnerable 
homeowners and renters. 
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Appendix A: Testing a different year’s code complaints: 2016 instead of 
2018 code complaint data 
 
I conducted the tests described in Chapters 3 and 4 using the most recent data 
available for code complaints and gentrification typology, even though the comparison 
years are not a perfect match. The code complaint data used in these tests captures all 
code complaints in Austin in 2018. The “Uprooted” maps and data, however, primarily 
ACS 2016 5-year demographics. Because ACS 5-year data functions as a 5-year average, 
it is most representative of the year 2014. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this report, 
complete 2014 code complaint records are not publicly available.  
 However, the question is worth asking: Is it possible that some or all of the 
Vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts from the last test – which were observed as having 
similar rates of code complaints as gentrifying tracts – might by 2018 actually be 
gentrifying themselves? Though the test is imperfect, I nevertheless reproduced the test 
using 2016 code complaint records. The methodology for this test was otherwise identical 
to the methodology described in the last chapter (with the additional Vulnerable but not 




Figure 9: 2016 Analysis of Variance, Code complaints per occupied household, tract-
level, City of Austin, 2018 
Although code complaint frequencies are lower across the board in 2016 
compared to 2018, the categorical distinctions and differences follow a very similar 
pattern. Code complaint frequency in Not gentrifying tracts is relatively low (3.4%). The 
frequency in Vulnerable but not gentrifying tracts is significantly higher (6.5%). That rate 
is almost the same for Susceptible tracts (6.4%) before ticking up for Gentrifying (7.2%) 
and Gentrified (7.5%) tracts. However, the message is the same: Tracts that are 
vulnerable to displacement and/or experiencing gentrification and neighborhood change 
experience significantly higher rates of code complaints than tracts that are not 
gentrifying and are not vulnerable. 
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Appendix B: Additional methodology step-by-step details – managing 
and joining data layers and content 
 
This appendix provides additional details to the methodological processes 
described in Chapter 3. I conducted the first stage of analysis in ArcGIS. Using the x and 
y coordinates from the Austin Code Complaint Cases spreadsheet, all 2018 code 
complaints were projected onto the map of Austin. This map also contained as a layer all 
Austin census tracts with the Uprooted attributes (gentrification stage, vulnerability, 
neighborhood name, and census tract number) as well as useful tract level demographic 
information (total population and total occupied households). The gentrification typology 
census tract layer attribute information was then joined to the Austin Code Complaint 
Cases layer, so that each code complaint entry now expressed the attributes from the tract 
layer (gentrification stage of the tract in which the complaint originated, tract 
vulnerability, neighborhood name, tract number, total tract population, and total tract 
occupied households).  
The Uprooted report excludes a handful of unique tracts from its analysis and that 
these tracts are not included in the gentrification typology tract layer used for this 
analysis. These tracts (the Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, the military base 
Camp Mabry, the abnormally dense and uniquely situated student-oriented West Campus 
neighborhood, the UT campus itself) were not included in the Uprooted report because 
they do not function as normal neighborhoods, and the demographic and housing market 
characteristics of these neighborhoods do not behave the way the vast majority of 
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neighborhoods do to gentrification and displacement. I decided to exclude these oddly 
behaving tracts from this analysis of code complaints and gentrification as well, for the 
same reasons. 
The Austin Code Complaint Cases data are not split into residential and non-
residential categories. Single family residential, multifamily, commercial, and industrial 
space code complaints are all lumped into the same dataset. Categorical data on these 
distinctions are not provided. The Uprooted report observes stages of residential 
gentrification and displacement (as opposed to commercial or cultural). This examination 
likewise seeks to understand the relationships between residential code complaints and 
residential gentrification and displacement. Downtown Austin may feature an abnormally 
high number of code complaints per occupied household, but we would expect that many 
or even most of those complaints would be non-residential given the overall character of 
the built environment and land uses in the Central Business District. Therefore, a strategy 
for isolating residential code complaints was developed: I overlaid the Austin zoning map 
on top of the other layers in order to isolate residential-only areas. The Austin Zoning 
Map features dozens of categories, which were combined for this purpose into 
“Residential”17 and “Non-Residential.”  
Planned Unit Developments and Mixed-Use zoned areas were excluded from the 
residential category for this study. One unfortunate loss from this decision is that of the 
                                                
17 The residential category includes the following Austin Zoning categories: RR, SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4A, 
SF4B, SF5, SF6, MH, MF1, MF2, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF6. 
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Mueller development, a mixed-use planned unit development which lays adjacent to 
much of Austin’s gentrification and displacement activity. 
A new layer was then generated, with the Austin Code Complaint Case points 
(with joined gentrification typology layer data) clipped to the residential zoned areas 
only. This produced a new layer with only points in residentially zoned areas. The 
attribute table from this layer was then exported as a dataset.18 
  
                                                
18 The resulting dataset contained 908 entries that had code complaints but no census tract or demographic 
info in the Uprooted layers. I looked at the addresses of 10 randomly selected entries (using a random 
number generator) of the 908 total to get a sense what areas they are coming from. 10 out of 10 randomly 
selected tracts were in the West Campus neighborhood, one of the tracts excluded from the “Uprooted” 
maps. In an earlier attempt using a non-random sample, I did find one entry that was not in West Campus 
that was in an unincorporated sliver of land in West Austin near Emma Long Metropolitan Park, 
surrounded by city-incorporated land. Because all of the tracts in the random and non-random samples 
were either in tracts excluded from the “Uprooted” maps or else not in the boundaries of the City of Austin, 
they were all excluded. 
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Appendix C: Adding a “vulnerability” category to the streamlined 
gentrification categories 
 
At the time of this study, access to pre-2016 code complaint volume data has not 
been provided by Austin Code and the City of Austin. Therefore, it is difficult to assess 
change over time for tracts experiencing neighborhood change. For example, if 
gentrifying tracts had a higher frequency of code complaints, it would not be possible to 
assess whether complaints in this tract type were always high even before they started to 
gentrify, or whether complaints increased with gentrification.  
Another way to approximate an answer to this question is to separate out another 
tract category, for tracts that are not gentrifying or susceptible but possess all of the 
demographic markers of vulnerability to gentrification and displacement. These tracts 
have a higher rate of many of the five demographic categories that denote neighborhood 
change in the “Uprooted” report. This is not a perfect comparison: Changes in real estate, 
demographic, migration, and economic trends (to name a few) in Austin, the MSA, the 
nation, and even the world could mean that a vulnerable tract today may not behave 
exactly the way a vulnerable-then gentrifying-now tract behaved 15 years ago. But 
without access to code complaint data from these currently gentrifying tracts from some 
earlier point in time for comparison, observing code complaint frequency in vulnerable 
but not gentrifying tracts acts as a useful proxy for how tracts in stages of gentrification 
may have behaved prior to gentrifying. 
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The “Uprooted” report maps provides information on tract vulnerability in a 





The vulnerability rating is an index of demographic indicators. Therefore, tracts 
can be “vulnerable” or “more vulnerable” and also show up in the typology column as 
already being at a stage of gentrification. Whether a vulnerable tract is gentrifying has to 
do with other indicators such as whether it’s experiencing demographic change over a 
period of time, and the housing market typology. In other words, there are some 
vulnerable tracts that are not currently gentrifying and others that are. 
I am able to generate a new typology category called “vulnerable but not 
gentrifying” by identifying tracts that are listed as “vulnerable” or “more vulnerable” in 
the vulnerability column, and also listed as “not gentrifying” in the typology column. For 
tracts that meet these criteria, the designation in the typology category is changed from 
“not gentrifying” to “vulnerable but not gentrifying.” We now have two typology 
categories that represent non-gentrifying tracts: “not gentrifying,” which now represents 
tracts that are not gentrifying and do not have demographic profiles that are vulnerable to 
displacement, and “vulnerable but not gentrifying,” which indicates tracts that are not 
currently gentrifying but possess some combination of demographic characteristics that 
would make them vulnerable to displacement should pressure increase. Within the 
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constraints described above, we can expect that these “vulnerable but not gentrifying” 
tracts behave more or less similarly to the way currently susceptible, gentrifying, and 
gentrified tracts behaved prior to gentrification. 
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Appendix D: Interview Protocol 
 
 As stated in Chapter 3, I used this basic protocol simply as a starting point for 
framing conversation. The interviews themselves were allowed to flow organically. From 
interview to interview I followed up on some questions in great detail, while other 
questions were not brought up much at all. 
1. [For Austin Code supervisors] Describe your role at Austin Code and your history 
with the department. [For experts and advocates] Describe your relationship to 
and history with code enforcement issues in Austin. 
2. [After showing and explaining results of quantitative and spatial tests] How do 
you interpret the results of these tests? How do you describe what you are seeing? 
3. What additional tests or clarifications would help you interpret these results? 
4. What, from your perspective, is the relationship between code enforcement and 
the displacement of vulnerable low-income renters, if any? 
5. What, from your perspective, is the relationship between code enforcement and 
the displacement of vulnerable low-income homeowners, if any? 
6. What is the mission of Austin Code? 
7. What do you think the mission or highest priority of Austin Code should be? 
8. What are your thoughts on reactive vs. proactive enforcement? 
9. What are your thoughts on the use of anonymous complaint systems in Code 
Enforcement? Do you see examples of abuse of this system? 
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10. Are there any reforms to the code enforcement process that you believe would 
improve the protection of vulnerable residents? 
a. What are the barriers to these reforms being enacted? 
  
 137 
Appendix E: Test result tables 
 
In Chapter 4, all test results are presented as bar charts for visual clarity. This 
appendix displays all test results as tables with specific values. 
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-level 
code complaints (CC) per occupied household 
(OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 3.9% 




Table 4: City of Austin 2018 tract-level code complaints per occupied household 
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-
level Land Use Violation code complaints (CC) 
per occupied household (OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 1.3% 




Table 5: City of Austin 2018 tract-level Land Use Violation code complaints per 
occupied household  
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-
level Property Abatement code complaints (CC) 
per occupied household (OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 1.8% 





Table 6: City of Austin 2018 tract-level Property Abatement code complaints per 
occupied household  
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-
level Structural Violation code complaints (CC) 
per occupied household (OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 0.6% 




Table 7: City of Austin 2018 tract-level Structural Violation code complaints per 
occupied household 
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-
level Work Without Permit code complaints (CC) 
per occupied household (OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 0.2% 




Table 8: City of Austin 2018 tract-level Work Without Permit code complaints per 
occupied household 
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-
level Single-family code complaints (CC) per 
occupied household (OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 3.4% 





Table 9: City of Austin 2018 tract-level Single-family code complaints per occupied 
household 
Analysis of Variance: City of Austin 2018 tract-
level Multi-family code complaints (CC) per 
occupied household (OccHH) 
Neighborhood Type CC/OccHH 
Not gentrifying, not vulnerable 0.8% 
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